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It has long been recognized that industrialization got under way in
the United States early in the nineteenth century and was largely con-
centrated in the Northeast throughout the antebellum period. The dra-
matic sectoral reallocation ofresources that accompanied this process
is generally acknowledged to have yielded a significantgain in measured
per capita income, ifonly because resources in that region were more
productive in industries other than agriculture. The extent ofproduc-
tivity growth within sectors, however, remains unclear. This gap in our
knowledge has been a serious obstacle to improving our understanding
ofthis initial phase ofindustrialization, because the record ofproduc-
tivity is so closely related to issues of the sources, location, timing,
and nature ofthis episode in American economic growth.
Evidence on the progress realized in manufacturing, in particular,
would have a direct bearing on whether the surge of rapid industrial
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expansion in the Northeast was driven by dynamic manufacturing in-
dustries that were generating sustained increases in productivity and
income or by a declining agricultural sector that was finding it increas-
ingly difficult to compete with producers outside the region. Moreover,
industry- specific estimates would help determine to what degree early
productivity growth in manufacturing was linked to capital- deepening
or capital-augmenting innovations. Some scholars have suggested that
these factors were virtual prerequisites for major gains in productivity,
while others have emphasized thatchanges in the organizationoflabor,
increases in the intensity ofwork, and other alterations in production
processes that were not dependent on additional capital equipment per
unit oflabor may have been important sources ofmeasured advances
(Landes 1969, 1985; Marglin 1974; David 1975; Chandler 1977; Sokoloff
1984b; Lazonick and Brush 1985).
Despite the clear significance ofthe issues involved, there have been
few studies of productivity growth during early United States indus-
trialization due to the relative inaccessibility of evidence.1 Recently
collected samples offirm data from the schedules of the 1820 Census
ofManufactures and the McLane Reportof1832 provide valuable new
sourcesofinformation, however(Sokoloff1982). Employingthese bod-
ies ofevidence in conjunction with the Bateman-Weiss samples offirms
from the schedules ofboth the 1850 and the 1860 Census ofManufac-
tures, and the aggregate data from those censuses, this paper seeks to
establish the record of productivity growth in northeastern manufac-
turing during this critical period ofindustrial development.
These sources are not without flaws, but the richness of the infor-
mation they contain makes them together an unequaled collection of
material for research on the subject. All ofthem provide reports ofthe
value ofoutputs produced and the quantity or value ofinputs utilized,
and thus indexes ofproductivity can be estimated for many industries
in eachofthe4years. Perhaps theprimaryconcerninvolvingthequality
ofthe datais that the firms included in the four cross-sectional samples
from the manufacturing survey and censuses may notbe representative
of the population of northeastern manufacturing firms during the re-
spective years.2 Problems ofthe representativeness ofdata are always
a serious matter and require special care in conducting the analysis.
Nevertheless, as will be discussed below, the samvle selection biases
that afflict these bodies of evidence seem unlikely to be responsible
for the qualitative results uncovered.
This paper reports estimates of labor and total factor productivity
for 13 manufacturing industries in the Northeast over the period from
1820 to 1860. It finds that although the highly mechanized and capital-
intensive industries, such as cotton and wool textiles, realized some-
what more rapid progress than the others did, even the latter managed681 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
major advances. The evidence appears to support the conclusion that
the manufacturing sector in the Northeast was quite dynamic during
this stage ofindustrialization, and that much ofits early productivity
growth can be explained by changes in production processes that did
not require mechanization or substantial increases in capital intensity.
This suggests, as has beenargued bya numberofrecentstudiesbuilding
on an old tradition, that developments such as increases in the division
and intensity oflaborwithin firms andotherrelatively subtle alterations
in technique, perhaps stimulated by the expansion of markets, may
have played important roles in accounting for the progress achieved.
Estimates of labor productivity over the period are presented in
section 13.2 of the paper. The procedures employed in constructing
them are discussed in some detail, and although they were consciously
designed to yield conservative estimatesofthe increase in productivity,
weighted averages indicate rates oflabor productivity growth that are
quite high by nineteenth- or twentieth-century standards. There is evi-
dence ofan acceleration in the pace ofadvance, particularly in the less
mechanized and capital-intensive industries. Estimates of total factor
productivity are presentedin section 13.3. They reveal thatifone treats
firm valuations of their capital investments as relatively accurate as-
sessments of the capital input, as I contend that one should, the data
imply that most manufacturing industries realized large gains in total
factor productivity over the period. As all classes ofindustries appear
to have manifested similar rates ofprogress, doubts about the primacy
ofcapital deepening orcapital intensity in generating productivity growth
are reinforced. Moreover, the estimated advances are of such a mag-
nitude that they appear to account, together with increases in the ratio
ofraw materials to labor, for nearly all ofthe rise in labor productivity.
Some general remarks on what these findings imply about the early
stages of industrialization in the United States are offered in section
13.4.
13.2 Estimates ofLabor Productivity
There are at least several reasons why the record of labor produc-
tivity deserves separate treatmentfrom thatoftotalfactor productivity.
Perhaps the major one is that movements in labor productivity convey
information about the evolution ofproduction methods that is not gen-
erally contained in the more comprehensive measure. Since several of
the most important issues relating to the developmentofmanufacturing
technology during early industrialization concern the direction and ex-
tent of changes in factor proportions, it would seem desirable to ex-
amine both labor and total factor productivity. The availability of the
two series is also useful in that investigation ofapparentinconsistencies682 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
between them can help to identify problems with the data or ofinter-
pretation. Finally, itmight be argued that, becausemovementsinoutput
perunit oflabor are more closely related to those in percapita income,
establishing the record of labor productivity, even in only this single
sector of the economy, would by itself directly contribute to our un-
derstanding of economic growth during this critical period. The ac-
counting exercise of decomposing the responsibility for increases in
labor productivity between changes in factor proportions and total
factor productivity, for example, may yield results suggestive ofwhat
similar calculations for per capita income would indicate.
Two measures oflabor productivity are employed here, value added
per equivalent worker and gross output per equivalent worker. Esti-
mates expressed in current dollars are presented in tables 13.1 and
13.2, respectively, for 13 industries at the years 1820, 1832, 1850, and
1860. The industries examined were selected so as to cover both the
majorones ofthe periodand a broadcross-sectionofthe manufacturing
sector, subject to the limitations imposed by the need for each industry
to be reasonably well represented in the samples ofmanufacturing firm
data and a desire to maintain conventional industrial classifications.3
Some industries do not have estimates of productivity reported for
certain years, because of an inadequate number of observations, but
the threshold for inclusion was set to keep the number of omissions
low.
Three sets ofestimates, A, B, and C, are reported for each industry.
They are computed over different subsets offirms, with the variation
in composition attributable to the progressive application of increas-
ingly stringent standards for separating establishments likely to be op-
erating part-time from those in full-time production. Part-time enter-
prises should be excluded from the subsamples over which the estimates
are prepared, because the measured productivity levels of such firms
are biased downward due to the general practice of reporting the av-
erage labor input over the period in operation, rather than over the
entire year.4 Since these firms generally failed to identify themselves
explicitly, several methods oforderingthe establishmentsbytheirprob-
ability ofbeing part-time operators, so that selected proportions could
be dropped from the subsamples over which productivity was esti-
mated, were applied to the problem and yielded roughly similar results.
The method and procedures underlying the construction of the three
sets ofsubsamples employed in this paper are explained in the note to
table 13.1. The logic behind reporting three sets of estimates is to
provide evidence on the sensitivity of the results to the assumptions
made about the prevalence ofpart-time operators in different years.5
Although intended to yield somewhat conservative estimates of the
rates ofproductivity growth over time, the B set represents the "best-683 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
guess" figures and will be the basis, unless otherwise indicated, for
the results discussed below.
The major implication of the estimates reported in tables 13.1 and
13.2 is that nominal labor productivity, whether evaluated in terms of
value added or gross output, increased substantially between 1820 and
1860. All of the 13 selected industries registered significant advances
in product per equivalent worker, by each ofthe measures. Ten ofthe
13 managed a greater than 50% increase in gross output per unit of
labor (GQLP) between 1820 and 1860, and eight did by the value-added
gauge of labor productivity (VLP).6 The unweighted averages of the
growth over the period in the value-added and gross-output measures
of labor productivity are 76% and 98%, respectively, whereas the
weighted average increases are only slightly different, 68% and 99%.7
This record ofadvance might not seem remarkable taken by itself, but,
considered together with the evidence of sharp decreases in output
prices (see table 13.3), the implied gains in real labor productivity are
dramatic indeed.
It is fortunate that the principal qualitative finding seems to be in-
sensitive to reasonable variation in the proportions offirms truncated
from the samples to deal with the problem ofthe inclusion ofpart-time
firms in the data. The A estimates imply much more substantial pro-
ductivity growth thanthe "best-guess" Bfigures, and the C set suggests
somewhat less progress, but all three provide evidence of an era of
major increases in manufacturing productivity. This general robustness
can be demonstrated by computing the implied growth in labor pro-
ductivity that results from an especially extreme adjustment for the
problem.8 If, for example, one accepts the C estimates for 1820, thus
assuming that an unrealistically high proportion offirms in the earlier
year operated part-time and that an extraordinary decline in their prev-
alence occurred, weighted averages of the estimated growth in labor
productivity over the 13 industries fall from 68 to 51 for value-added
labor productivity and from 99% to 85% for gross-output labor pro-
ductivity. These are not trivial alterations to the quantitative results,
but the picture of labor productivity growth in manufacturing that
emerges from the data remains essentially unchanged. Such sensitivity
analysis suggests that although the initial truncation ofestablishments
for likely part-time operations has major effects on estimated produc-
tivity levels and growth, the influence of successive truncations de-
clines, to the point that no plausible revision ofthe proportion offirms
assumed to be operatingparttime in 1820could reverse the basic finding
of major advances over the period.
There are several troubling features ofthe estimates that should be
considered in interpreting them, but they do not seem to warrant a


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.690 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
these is the irregular pattern ofadvance that a number ofthe industries
exhibit. Nominal labor productivity does not always increase contin-
uously across the subperiods, and even in those industries where it
does, the apparent rates of growth fluctuate widely over time. Some
variability should be expected, however, since the nominal estimates
are not adjusted for the substantial and erratic changes in the prices
of many commodities, including outputs and raw materials, that oc-
curred during the period. Moreover, a great deal of random variation
in the estimates ofproductivity would also be generated by the limited
numbers of observation~.9This latter problem is quite serious for es-
timating the growth in productivity over individual subperiods, but
would be expected to decline in significance for the study oflong-term
changes, because the proportion ofthe variation in estimated produc-
tivity due to substantive or actual movements in productivity should
increase with the length ofthe period under examination.
Also puzzling are the sometimes large discrepancies between the
estimates computed from the firm-level information and those from
aggregate data in 1850 and 1860. The industry estimates drawn from
these two sources are frequently similar but diverge substantially in
some cases, particularly in 1850. One might have expected the figures
based on aggregate data to be generally lower, because ofthe presumed
inclusion ofpart- time establishments in those totals. However, where
there are large disparities, it is typically these estimates which exceed
those from the firm data. This might seem to imply that the prevalence,
or the production, of part-time operators was rather modest in those
years. Inaddition, the patternis consistentwith the view thatthe design
ofthe 1850 and 1860 samples served to bias the productivity estimates
for those years significantly downward. to Accordingly, one might sup-
pose that the aggregate- based estimates would be more representative
ofthe actual productivity levels in the respective industries than those
computed from firm data. Whatever the reasons for the discrepancies,
the close correspondence between the estimates in 1860 means that
the qualitative results on productivity growth over the entire period
are not sensitive to the choice between the firm- and aggregate-based
figures for that year.
Although the series ofcurrent-dollar estimates are useful in roughly
gauging the long- term trends in labor productivity, they are not nearly
as informative as would be series expressed in constant dollars. Ac-
cordingly, a variety ofprice indexes have been assembled to construct
estimates of real productivity from current-dollar values, and are re-
portedin table 13.3. Measuresofthechanges in thepricesoftheoutputs
and ofthe raw materials for eac-h ofthe 13 industries would ofcourse
be preferred for the calculation of the constant-dollar estimates. This
goal could not be achieved, buta wide-ranging survey ofavailable price691 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Table 13.3 Price Indexes, 1820-60
Indexes 1820 1832 1850 1860
General output price indexes
Consumer price index 156 119 93 100
Wholesale price index 114 99 88 102
Industry price indexes:
Boots/shoes
Q 166 155 111 100
RM 113 124 88 113
K 140 135 103 105
Coacheslharnesses
Q 178 141 95 100
RM 137 119 106 102
K 150 128 109 102
Cotton textiles
Q 179 115 78 98
RM 155 88 69 110
K 160 130 112 103
Furniture/woodwork
Q 200 149 111 100
RM 111 102 121 98
K 151 126 115 100
Glass
Q 190 109 81 100
RM 114 99 88 102
K 149 115 99 101
Hats
Q 166 155 111 105
RM 114 99 88 102
K 142 127 105 103
Iron
Q 171 145 113 100
RM 128 111 99 102
K 159 137 118 103
Liquors
Q 96 91 104
RM 57 83 96
K 124 106 102
Flour/grist mills
Q 91 87 98
RM 57 83 96
K 142 115 102
Paper
Q 319 244 125 104
RM 179 115 78 98
K 164 136 111 101
Tanning
Q 90 99 70 113
RM 65 72 51 113
K 104 101 81 108
(continued)692 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 13.3 (continued)
Indexes 1820 1832 1850 1860
Tobacco
Q 138 69 100 127
RM 138 69 100 127
K 140 81 103 122
Wool textiles
Q 161 138 133 102
RM 95 74 80 104
K 144 124 114 102
Capital component price indexes
Machinery 183 159 138 107
Structures 136 118 107 100
Notes and sources: Corresponding to the productivity estimates, the price indexes re-
ported for 1832, 1850, and 1860 actually refer to the price levels in 1831, 1849, and 1859.
The price indexes, however, are expressed relative to an 1860 standard of 100. The
industry-specific capital price indexes were constructed as a weighted average of the
price indexes for "structures" and "machinery," as well as of the industry-specific
indexes for output and raw materials. The weights were obtained from firm-level data
on the composition ofthe total capital investment contained in the McLane Report or,
when there were insufficient observations from 1832, from aggregate information con-
tained in the report ofthe 1890 CensusofManufactures. See Sokoloff(1984a) and United
States Census Office (1895). The "structures" and "machinery" indexes were weighted
by the shares of the total capital investment that they accounted for in the respective
industries. The remaining proportion of the capital investment was assumed to consist
entirely of inventories, which were divided equally between output and raw materials.
Hence, the latter two indexes received halfofthe weight for inventories in constructing
each industry's capital price series.
General Output: Consumer and wholesale price indexes (CPI and WPI henceforth) from
United States Bureau ofthe Census (1975, E-135 and E-52).
Boots/shoes: Outputprice index for "shoes" from Brady(1966). Interpolation was based
on the WPI (as were all interpolations of price indexes drawn from Brady). The index
for raw materials was constructed from the 1850 and 1860 firm data, and from United
States Bureau ofthe Census (1975, E-55).
Coacheslhamesses: Output index constructed from that for "carriages, buggies, and
wagons" in Brady (1966) and from the 1850 and 1860 firm data. The index for raw
materials also consists ofa segment obtained from these data, spliced into the WPI.
Cottontextiles: Boththe outputand raw materials indexes arefrom United StatesBureau
of the Census (1975, E-128, E-126).
Furniture/woodwork: The output index is that for "furniture" from Brady (1966), and
the raw materials index is from United States Bureau of the Census (1975, E-59) and
the 1850 and 1860 firm data.
Glass: The output index is that for "window glass" from Brady (1964). The WPI serves
as the index for raw materials.
Hats: The output index is that for "men's hats" from Brady (1964). The WPI serves as
the index for raw materials.
Iron: The output index was constructed from several price series contained in Cole
(1938). The raw materials index is the WPI, with a segment estimated from the 1850 and
1860 firm data spliced in.
Liquors: Both indexes are from United States Bureauofthe Census (1975, E-62, E-123).
Mills: Both indexes are from United States Bureau ofthe Census (1975, E-124, E-123).
Paper: The output price index is that for "writing paper" from Brady (1966). The index
for raw materials is from United States Bureau of the Census (1975, E-128).693 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
18ble 13.3 (continued)
Tanning: The same price index serves here as the basisfor boththe outputand raw
materials indexes, United States Bureauofthe Census (1975, E-55). Thetwo indexes
differ slightly, however, in that the segments between 1850 and 1860 wereobtainedfrom
the firm datafor those years.
Tobacco: A price indexfor''tobacco" was constructedfrom several series appearingin
Cole (1938). This index was utilized for bothoutputs and raw materials.
Wool textiles: Theoutputindex is for "woolenworstedgoods" from Brady (1966). The
indexfor raw materials was constructedfrom information in Cole (1938).
Capital componentprice indexes: The indexes for structures and machinery arefor
"factories, office buildings" and "machine-shopproducts," respectively. Bothare
drawn from Brady(1966).
series for the period yielded industry-specific indexes for the outputs
of all 13 industries, and for the raw materials of nine.ll The Warren
and Pearson wholesale price index (henceforth referred to as the WPI)
was employed as the index for the prices of raw materials in the re-
maining four industries. In cases where there was reason to doubt the
representativeness ofan index, and where the procedure was feasible,
the change in price between 1850 and 1860 was estimated from the
information in the samples from those years, and spliced into the orig-
inal series. 12
In addition to these price indexes for outputs and raw materials, table
13.3 also presents industry-specific estimates of the price of capital.
These indexes ofthe price ofcapital will be utilized in the calculations
of total factor productivity treated below, and were computed as
weighted averages of the indexes for structures, machinery, outputs,
and raw materials. The weights vary across industries, and were ob-
tained from industry-specific proportions of capital invested in struc-
tures and land, machinery and tools, and inventories. Inventories were
assumed to have been composed of equal amounts of outputs and of
raw materials.
Perhaps the most striking general pattern that emerges from an ex-
amination oftable 13.3 is thatthe pricesofoutputsdeclined significantly
relative to those of raw materials and capital between 1820 and 1860.
In all of the 13 industries but tobacco, where the same series was
adopted for both outputs and raw materials, the index for output prices
fell relative to that for raw materials; the index declined relative to that
for capital in 10 of the 13. Since it is also clear that real wages rose
substantially over the period, one can infer, by duality, that total factor
productivity must have increased (Sokoloff 1983).
Indexes of real value added and real gross output per equivalent
worker have been constructed for the 13 industries by applying the
output price series to the conversion of the current-dollar labor pro-
ductivity estimates to units ofconstant dollars. These indexes, which
are presented in tables 13.4 and 13.5, respectively, indicate that all of694 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
18ble 13.4 Index ofReal Value Added per Equivalent Worker in Selected
Manufacturing Industries, 1820-60
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Boots/shoes
A 100 154 165 259 254
B 100 135 142 224 217
C 100 131 130 216 200
Coaches/hamesses
A 100 88 154 172 260 225
B 100 93 176 166 253 218
C 100 93 173 162 229 213
Cotton textiles
A 100 222 210 299 256 400
B 100 201 192 270 231 361
C 100 175 196 231 247 308
Furniture/woodwork 100
A 100 122 174 236 337 341
B 100 113 175 215 321 311
C 104 155 188 291 272
Glass
A 100 274 285 265
B 100 274 285 265
C 100 253 268 249
Hats
A 100 139 212 227 299 306
B 100 119 184 195 257 263
C 100 145 228 229 297 309
Iron
A 100 142 203 277 318
B 100 115 122 180 190
C 100 122 120 203 188
Liquors
A 100 127 209 220 256
B 100 115 173 193 212
C 100 126 166 210 203
Flour/grist mills
A 100 98 128 140 149
B 100 88 111 128 129
C 100 96 98 133 114
Paper
A 100 179 588 547 509 813
B 100 176 580 539 511 801
C 100 181 521 523 562 777
Tanning
A 100 160 198 295 193 248
B 100 128 163 234 157 196
C 100 99 145 196 143 165695 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Table 13.4 (continued)
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Tobacco
A 100 141 108 261 237
B 100 135 104 250 227
C 100 148 98 240 215
Wool textiles
A 100 203 237 183 368 359
B 100 163 192 146 295 288
C 100 147 173 132 256 259
Average
Weighted (B) 100 [159] [168] 192 [230] 264
Unweighted (B) 100 [158] [187] 208 [250] 283
Notes and sources: See the notes to tables 13.1 and 13.3. The estimates of value added
per equivalent worker presented in table 13.1 were converted to constant dollars by
employing the price indexes reported in table 13.3, and then normalized relative to a
base of 100 representing the respective industry's level in 1820. The weights employed
in computing the weighted averages are equivalent to the industry shares of the value
added produced in the northeastern states in 1850, and were calculated from information
contained in United States Census Office (1858). The weights were normalized so that
their sum was equal to one whenever there were missing values. Averages based on
fewer than 13 industries (affected by missing values) are reported within brackets.
the industries realized major advances in real labor productivity, by
either measure, between 1820 and 1860. Weighted averages ofthe rec-
ords of the industries yield, taking the estimates based on aggregate
data as the standard for 1860, increases of 164% in value added per
equivalent worker and 187% by the alternative gauge. Only very few
failed to register gains of 100%. It is interesting to note that in most
industries the progress in gross output per equivalent worker signifi-
cantly exceeded that in value added perequivalent worker. This feature
ofthe results presumably reflects a rapid growth in the amounts ofraw
materials processed per unit oflabor during the period.
As for the reliability of these labor productivity estimates, it must
be admitted that even after their conversion to constant dollars, there
remain many anomalies where the productivity growth indicated for
an industry over a subperiod is either implausibly high or low. These
cases generally involve rather short spans of time, but not always.
Many ofthem might be attributed to noise in the point estimates gen-
erated by a paucity ofobservations, inappropriate or inaccurate price
indexes, rapid changes in the factor proportions utilized, varying de-
grees or types of sample selection bias over the years included, or
cyclical effects, but their number is nevertheless unsettling. It is, how-
ever, reassuring to note that the frequency and magnitude of such696 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 13.5 IndexofRealGross OutputperEquivalentWorkerinSelected
fttanufa~gIndustries,1820-60
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Boots/shoes
A 100 161 163 290 258
B 100 145 145 260 230
C 100 149 142 263 224
Coaches/hamesses
A 100 83 164 164 240 201
B 100 86 188 154 233 194
C 100 85 189 155 218 190
Cotton textiles
A 100 216 359 369 288 409
B 100 200 336 341 267 379
C 100 182 301 309 361 343
FumiturelWoodwork
A 100 144 207 238 325 327
B 100 138 201 225 320 309
C 100 127 181 197 288 270
Glass
A 100 335 305 290
B 100 335 305 290
C 100 312 284 269
Hats
A 100 138 250 240 371 319
B 100 122 223 213 328 282
C 100 139 252 234 362 311
Iron
A 100 148 205 329 321
B 100 105 125 218 195
C 100 99 116 228 181
Liquors
A 100 99 227 253 252
B 100 90 187 221 209
C 100 98 180 231 201
Flour/grist mills
A 100 139 175 183 196
B 100 123 150 166 167
C 100 141 144 172 160
Paper
A 100 278 823 789 744 1050
B 100 275 816 783 751 1042
C 100 280 722 764 833 1016
Tanning
A 100 164 213 288 257 333
B 100 136 180 237 217 274
C 100 108 167 201 198 234697 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
'I8ble 13.5 (continued)
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Tobacco
A 100 150 147 289 182
B 100 147 145 284 178
C 100 164 140 280 173
Wool textiles
A 100 286 314 274 486 500
B 100 236 262 226 401 412
C 100 216 238 205 369 373
Average
Weighted (B) 100 [186] [207] 220 [265] 287
Unweighted (B) 100 [191] [235] 249 [305] 320
Notes and sources: See the notes to tables 13.2 and 13.3. The estimates ofgross output
per equivalent worker in current dollars presented in table 13.2 were converted to con-
stant dollars by employing the price indexes reported in table 13.3 and then normalized
relative to a base of 100 representing the respective industry's level in 1820. The weights
employed in computing the weighted averages are equivalent to the industry shares of
gross output produced in the northeastern states in 1850, and were calculated from
information contained in United States Census Office (1858). The weights were nor-
malized sothattheirsumwasequaltoonewhenevertherewere missingvalues. Averages
based on fewer than thirteen industries (affected by missing values) are reported within
brackets.
strange results are greatly reduced in the series oftotal factor produc-
tivity estimates discussed below. 13 The industry with the most puzzling
record is paper, which appears, by both measures oflaborproductivity,
to have realized astonishingly high rates ofadvance, particularly after
1832. Although substantial progress would be expected, because ofthe
dramatic increases in the utilization of raw materials and capital per
unit oflaboroverthe period, the estimated gains are probably too large
to be believed. Given that this qualitative result is not sensitive to the
choice between the firm-level and aggregate estimates, the problem
may stem from the output price index employed. 14 Anomalies in the
productivity series for boots/shoes, tanning, and tobacco are also as-
sociated with suspicious movements in the relevant price indexes. IS•
The per annum growth rates oflabor productivity presented in table
13.6 were computed from the B sets ofindexes in table 13.4 and 13.5.
Rates ofadvance are reported for the entire period from 1820 to 1860,
as well as for several subperiods. The estimates indicate that labor
productivity increased rapidly in virtually all industries, ranging from
0.60/0-0.7% and 1.3% per annum for VLP and GQLP, respectively, in
flour/grist mills to 4.30/0-5.5% and 5.30/0-6.2% in paper. Weighted av-
erages of the performance of the 13 industries yield estimated ranges698 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
18ble 13.6 Growth Rates ofLabor Productivity ill Selected Manufacturing
Industries, 1820-60 ('10)
Industry 1820-32 1820-50 1850-60 1820-60
Boots/shoes
VLP 1.0-1.2 4.4-5.2 2.0-2.1
GQLP 1.3-1.3 4.7-6.0 2.2-2.5
Coacheslharnesses
VLP -0.7 1.8-2.0 2.7-3.7 2.0-2.4
GQLP -1.4 1.6-2.2 2.1-2.2 1.7-2.2
Cotton textiles
VLP 6.6 2.3-3.5 1.9-2.9 2.2-3.3
GQLP 6.5 4.3-4.3 -2.3-1.0 2.5-3.5
Furniture/woodwork
VLP 1.1 1.9-2.7 3.8-6.2 2.9-3~0
GQLP 3.0 2.4-2.8 3.2-4.8 2.9-3.0
Glass
VLP 9.6 3.7 -0.7 2.5
GQLP 11.6 3.9 -0.5 2.8
Hats
VLP 1.6 2.1-2.3 3.0-3.4 2.4-2.5
GQLP 1.9 2.6-2.8 2.9-4.0 2.7-3.1
Iron
VLP 0.5-0.7 4.6-4.6 1.5-1.7
GQLP 0.2-0.8 4.6-7.5 1.7-2.0
Liquors
VLP 0.5-1.9 2.0-5.3 1.7-1.9
GQLP -0.4-2.2 1.1-9.4 1.9-2.1
Flour/grist mills
VLP -0.4-0.4 1.6-3.8 0.6-0.7
GQLP 0.7-1.4 1.1-3.0 1.3-1.3
Paper
VLP 5.3 6.0-6.2 -1.2-4.0 4.3-5.5
GQLP 9.7 7.4-7.5 -0.8-2.9 5.3-6.2
Tanning
VLP 2.2 1.7-3.0 -1.7-0.4 1.2-1.7
GQLP 2.8 2.1-3.0 1.5-1.8 2.0-2.6
Tobacco
VLP 0.1-1.0 6.3-8.1 2.1-2.4
GQLP 1.3-1.3 2.1-6.8 1.5-2.7
Wool textiles
VLP 4.5 1.3-2.3 4.4-7.0 2.7-2.8
GQLP 8.1 2.8-3.4 4.4-6.2 3.6-3.7
Weighted average
VLP [4.3] [1.8]-2.3 3.2-[3.2] [2.2]-2.5
GQLP [5.8] [2.5]-2.7 2.5-[2.7] [2.5]-2.7
Notes and sources: These annual rates of growth were computed from the constant-
dollar estimates of labor productivity presented in set B of tables 13.4 and 13.5. The
VLP estimates refer to the growth ofvalue added per equivalent worker, and the GQLP
refer to the growth ofgross output per equivalent worker. Ranges ofestimates are often
presented, reflecting the differences between the figures derivedfrom firm dataand those
based on aggregate data. See the notes to tables 13.4 and 13.5.699 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
of2.20/0-2.5% and 2.50/0-2.7% for the rates ofgrowth ofthe two mea-
sures of labor productivity. These figures are remarkable in that they
are drawn from the experience of industries that together accounted
for a large share of the entire manufacturing sector in the Northeast
and yet are substantially higher than those that other scholars con-
cerned with antebellum growth have calculated for the United States
economy as a whole (David 1967, 1977; Gallman 1972a, 1972b).
Theseestimatesofproductivitygrowthinnortheasternmanufacturing
during early industrialization may exceed what might have been ex-
pectedfrom previousworkontheera,buttheyseemquitereasonableby
other historical standards. For example, McCloskey (1981) has com-
puted rates ofproductivity growth for four manufacturing industries in
Britain during that country's initial phase ofindustrial development, 1780
to 1860. His calculations suggest that the British record ofadvance was
similar to that observed here in the American Northeast. Ofperhaps even
greaterinterest, ourestimates oflaborproductivitygrowth during early
industrialization are slightly larger than those computed by Kendrick
(1961) for the UnitedStatesmanufacturingsectorbetween 1869and 1957.
Anotherfinding thatemergesfrom theseestimatesis that, onaverage,
there is weak evidence for acceleration in the rate oflaborproductivity
growth over the period. This claim is based primarily on a comparison
of the experience between 1820 and 1850 with that between 1850 and
1860 and thus must be offered tentatively. An analysis focusing on the
performance before and after 1832, ofthe eight industries for which we
have estimates in that year, reinforces the grounds for skepticismabout
the occurrence ofacceleration. Whenthe thirteenindustries are consid-
eredtogether, theyexhibita markedincreasein the rateoflaborproduc-
tivity growth by the VLP measure, from 1.80/0-2.3% perannum before
1850 to3.2%following, butnochangebytheGQLPmeasure. According
to the latter, labor productivity rose at a roughly constant 2.50/0-2.7%
perannumbetween 1820and 1850, as well asbetween 1850and 1860. On
an individual industry basis, nine ofthe thirteen enjoyed faster growth
during the lattersubperiod, byeithermeasure, than in the former. Whether
ornot the pace quickened overtime, it is clearthat rapid progress must
have been realized as early as the 1820s. While evidence ofacceleration
would conform with the work of scholars who view the diffusion of
mechanization across manufacturing industries during the 1840s and 1850s
as the crucial development behind productivity growth in that sector,
this perspective, even ifit were more strongly supported by the data,
contributeslittletounderstandinghowandwhytheimpressiveadvances
between 1820 and 1850 were achieved (Chandler 1977).
Given that the utilization ofsophisticated machinery and highly capital-
intensive production processes were essentially confined to but a few
industries until late in the period, the finding that a broad range ofman-700 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
ufacturing industries enjoyed substantial gains in productivity through-
out the early nineteenth century might tend to enhance appreciation of
the importance ofthe changes in labororganizationand otherrelatively
modest alterations in technique that seem generally to have been adopted
soonerand more widely. Anotherreaction, however, would be to ques-
tion the accuracy ofthe estimates ofproductivity growth. Comparisons
betweenthe rates reported here and those computedfor otherplaces or
eras do provide some check on the plausibility ofthe results, but those
drawn with alternative industry-specific figures for the same period would
be even more informative. Unfortunately, such estimates are quite scarce,
and the only prominent industry for which they are readily available is
cotton textiles. As for that industry, the rates oflabor productivity growth
presentedherearegenerallylowerthanwhatotherscholars havefound.
Davis and Stettler (1966) calculated that gross output per worker in the
entire United States industry increased at rates of4.1% per annum be-
tween 1820 and 1860 and of3.4% between 1832 and 1860, as compared
to the 2.50/0-3.5% and 1.90/0-2.3% rates for the respective periods re-
ported here. Their estimates for cotton textiles in Massachusetts indi-
cate somewhat slower rates ofadvance in that state; but their figure of
2.2% per annum growth between 1832 and 1860, resembling the 2.0%
and2.5% ratesofMcGouldrick(1968) andLayer(1955) for mills in Low-
ell during roughly the same years, is near the upper end ofour range.
Nickless's (1979) analysis of Layer's data on three Lowell establish-
ments yields an even higher estim.ate, 3.3% per annum, for the period
from 1836 to 1860. Hence, the evidencefrom theonly otherindustryfor
which independent estimates are easily obtained suggests that our fig-
ures onlaborproductivitygrowth are onthe low side, as they were con-
structedto be.
A skeptic might not accept the number orrelevance ofthe standards
of comparison utilized, and continue to dispute the estimates of the
rates ofadvances as too high, claiming that the results were an artifact
due ~o some defect in the data or in the way they were derived. There
are, indeed, several aspects ofthe estimation procedure that could be
ofsufficient importance to accountfor the findings ofrapid productivity
growth across a wide spectrum of manufacturing industries and, on
average, in the sector at large. Perhaps the most obvious of these is
the selection of price indexes. As is clear from the indexes listed in
table 13.3, there were substantial fluctuations in both absolute and
relative prices over the period from 1820to 1860. In this context, it is
conceivable that some ofthe price indexes utilized might diverge sig-
nificantly from the actual movement ofthe relevant prices, particularly
since the indexes frequently pertain only toone specific product orraw
material ofan industry and in several cases were drawn from the WPI.
~evertheless, in orderfor there to be a qualitatively important upward701 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
bias in the estimates of productivity growth, the respective price in-
dexes would have to seriously overstate the decline in output prices
relative to input prices. Given the absence ofany evidence orargument
that such a systematic pattern in the errors ofthe price indexes across
industries exists, there would seem to be no basis for accepting the
argument that inaccurate price indexes account for the general finding
ofrapid labor productivity growth.
There are severalotherreasons to doubt the severity ofthe problems
with the price indexes. The first is thatwhenmultiple priceindexes were
available for an industry, the most conservative ofthem generally were
selected for use, biasing the estimated rates of productivity growth
downward. Anotherfactor that mitigates the significance ofpossible er-
rors in the indexes is that the value-added figures were deflated to con-
stant dollars with only output price indexes, instead ofconverting the
values ofgross outputs and raw materials separately. In manufacturing
industries in which the prices ofthe raw materials consumedfell relative
to the output prices, this procedure would lead the advance over time
in real labor productivity to be overestimated. The evidence, however,
suggests that it was the relative price of the outputs that typically de-
clined during the period. Of the eight industries included in table 13.3
that have separate and industry-specific indexes for outputs and inputs,
all experienced a decrease in the former relative to the latter. To the
extent that this pattern was characteristic ofthe manufacturing sector,
the employment ofoutput price series to deflate the nominal value-added
figures should tend to bias estimates ofproductivity growth downward,
notupward. Hence, thelikelihoodthatthe resultofsubstantialadvances
was due to inaccurate price indexes seems even more remote. Given
that there are undoubtedly some errors in the price indexes utilized,
however, and that the magnitude and perhaps the direction ofthe biases
referred to must vary across industries, one should be cautious about
comparing the relative performances reported for individual industries.
Although the rates ofproductivity growth should be biased downward
in most industries, the variability in the extent ofthe biases at the in-
dustry level implies that the record ofany particularindustry relative to
another might be quite fragile. 16
The other feature ofthe construction ofthe estimates that the qual-
itative results might plausibly be sensitive to is the method ofadjust-
ment for the inclusion of establishments operating part-time in the
samples. This is a potentially important problem, because such enter-
prises did not generally explicitly identify themselves as such, became
less prevalent in manufacturing over time, and had their measures of
productivity biased downward from the actual levels.17 As discussed
above, the logic of the procedure adopted to deal with the dilemma
was basedonthe assumption thatthelowerthe totalfactorproductivity702 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
ofan establishment, the greaterthe likelihood it operatedonly afraction
of the year. Generous assessments of the prevalence of part-time op-
erations in the various years were made, and corresponding percent-
ages of the least productive enterprises were dropped from the re-
spective samples to obtain the subsamples over which the sets of
estimates were computed. The B set of estimates was intended to
represent conservative "best-guess" figures, and provides the basis
for the rates ofgrowth reported in table 13.6. Ifthe adjustments to the
samples underestimated the extent ofpart-time operations in 1820, or
especially the decrease in their prevalence over time, then the rates of
productivity growth would likely be biased upward. This is a possibility,
but as an examination of the nominal figures in tables 13.1 and 13.2
indicates, the qualitative result of rapid productivity growth, on av-
erage, in manufacturing is not sensitive to reasonable variation in the
proportions of firms presumed to have been operating part-time and
truncated from the samples. Estimates of the advances in several of
the industries, such as iron and tanning, might be substantially affected,
however, as could the relative rates of progress in some industries
versus others.
There are other aspects of the estimation procedures that might be
expected to yield biased results, but they are more likely to lead to
understatements ofthe advances in productivity than overstatements.
The first concerns the manner in which value added was computed.
Each ofthe bodies ofdata employed contains reports of the value of
outputs produced and the value of raw materials consumed by the
particular firm or industry. Value added was calculated in a straight-
forward fashion by deducting the value of the raw materials from the
total value of output. The potential bias arises from the additional
category of expenses specified by firms in the 1820 Census of Manu-
factures. This class of production costs was defined as "contingent
expenses" and included the costs ofitems such as fuel, insurance, and
repairs to equipment. Since none ofthe other surveys collected infor-
mation on a similar category ofexpenses, "contingentexpenses " were
ignored in the calculation ofthe value-added figures for 1820. If, how-
ever, some ofthe expenditures on inputs counted among "contingent
expenses" in that year were included as raw materials later, then the
value added per firm would be overestimated in 1820 relative to that
in other years, and the growth in the value-added measures of pro-
ductivity underestimated.
Another possible source ofsystematic errorin the preparation ofthe
productivity estimates is the method ofaggregating different classes of
workers into units of adult male equivalents. Females and boys have
been treated as equal, in terms of their labor input, to one-half of an
adult male employee, with these weights having been drawn from evi-703 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
dence on the relative wages of the groups prevailing near the end of
the period.18 In both the 1820 Census ofManufactures and the McLane
Report of 1832, each of the three types of workers was enumerated
separately. There were only two classifications of employees utilized
in the 1850 and 1860 censuses, however, males and females. For those
years, the reported number ofmale workers in each industry was de-
composed into adults and boys by assuming that the industry-specific
proportions of males that were boys were the same in 1850 and 1860
as they had been in 1820. 19 Since the shares of male employees that
were boys probably rose somewhat over the period, a small upward
bias might be imparted by this procedure to the estimation ofthe labor
inputs in the later, relative to the earlier, years (Goldin and Sokoloff
1982). As a consequence, estimates ofproductivity in those years, and
thus ofits growth over time, would tend to be biased downward.
One might also expect the estimates of productivity growth during
the period to understate the actual record because of the problems in
the sample selection that afflict the various bodies of data. First, the
systematic undercounting of smaller establishments in the 1820 and
1832 samples should probably generate overestimates of the produc-
tivity levels in those years.20Inaddition, the unrepresentativecharacter
of the samples from 1850 and 1860 would be expected to yield under-
estimates. These two samples were designed to incorporate a certain
minimum number of observations from each state that had surviving
data, and hence they suffer from a disproportionate representation of
manufacturing firms from states that had relatively limited industrial
development orsmall populations (Atack et ale 1979). As the firms from
such states tended to be less productive than those from other areas,
at least partially because oftheir smaller scales ofoperation, the levels
ofproductivity estimated from the samples should be lower than those
actually prevailing in the Northeast at the respective years. Moreover,
the inclusion ofpart-time establishments in the aggregate datafrom the
1850 and 1860 censuses means that the estimates obtained from these
sources are downward biased as well. Hence, with productivity levels
overestimatedfor 1820 and underestimated for 1850 and 1860, the rates
ofadvance derived should be lower than those that were realized.
The above discussion has reviewed, in considerable detail, many of
the features of the data sources and the estimation procedures that
might have contributed to inaccurate orbiased assessments ofthe pro-
ductivity growth between 1820 and 1860. It has been argued that most
of them would be expected to have led to estimates that were biased
downward. The chiefexception to this generalizationaboutthe impacts
ofthe potential biases is the effect ofa decline overtime in the relative
amount of manufacturing production carried out by firms operating
seasonally. The disproportionate truncation of the least productive704 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
manufacturing establishments from the 1820 sample, however, should
probably more than compensate for this problem, because the per-
centages dropped from the analysis for the 13 industries seem likely
to have exceeded those offirms that were part-time enterprises. Even
if the adjustments underlying the B set of estimates, on which the
discussion focuses, are not quite sufficient, sensitivity analysis em-
ploying set C for 1820 indicates that the qualitative results would not
be altered by any reasonable relaxation ofthe assumptions concerning
the prevalence ofseasonal operations in that year.21 Particularly when
one considers the net effect ofall the biases, it appears likely that the
estimates ofproductivity growth in manufacturing understates, on av-
erage, the actual record.
The evidence seems to supportthe conclusionthatlaborproductivity
growth in manufacturing during this initial phase of industrialization
was remarkably rapid and significantly higher than scholars may have
reckoned previously. What is one to make of this performance? One
possibility is to attribute the progress to the combined effects of a
variety of related developments marking the period that include the
introduction and diffusion of machinery, increases in capital and raw
materials intensity, changes in the organization oflabor, the realization
of scale economies, learning by doing, and the impact of expanding
markets through the selecting out ofinefficient producers and the stim-
ulation oftechnical innovation. One might also explain the remarkably
high rates of labor productivity growth as being at least partially ac-
countedfor by the severecontraction thatoccurredinthe United States
between 1816 and 1821, and might have dragged productivity in 1820
well below its trend level. From this perspective, the estimates could
accurately reflect the actual amount of labor productivity growth be-
tween 1820 and 1860 but convey a misleading impression about the
long-term record.
Although cyclical effects might, in principle, have been large, the
qualitative findings with respect to productivity growth over the entire
periodfrom 1820 to 1860are notfundamentally altered whenone makes
adjustments for them. In order to gauge the potential magnitudes of
the cyclical effects on manufacturing productivity, estimates of the
trend over time in gross output per worker were computed through
regression analysis from the annual series on cotton textiles assembled
by Davis and Stettler(1966) and by Layer(1955), and then the residuals
were compared with the NBER classifications ofcyclical behavior by
year (Thorp 1926). Both sets of residuals indicate some procyclical
variation, with the greatestdeviations below trend in laborproductivity
being achieved, on average, one year before the trough ofthe business
cycle. The Davis and Stettler series implies much greater cyclical vari-
ation than the Layer series, but even here the effect seems somewhat70S Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
modest. In the average business cycle, labor productivity, as measured
by gross output per worker, fell to only 4.2% below trend during the
year before the trough.22 Moreover" over the limited period of time
spanned by their data, the magnitude ofthe deviation from trend does
not appear to have been systematically related to the duration of the
cycle. It is not clear whether cyclical variation in labor productivity
should be more orless in cottontextiles than in otherindustries. Never-
theless, even ifthe 4.2% figure is doubled and applied to all manufac-
turing industries, the adjustment for the business cycle in 1820 would
not change the qualitative results concerning the pace of labor pro-
ductivity growth over the period under study. Such refinements would
be even less significant for the otheryears covered by the data, because
none of them seem to have been associated with extreme cyclical
activity.23
It is apparent that taking cyclical factors into consideration does not
appreciably alter the interpretation ofthe finding that there were major
increases in labor productivity across a wide range of manufacturing
industries during the antebellum period. The relative importance ofthe
various contributors, such as capital deepening or mechanization, to
these developments, however, is less clear. That virtually all of the
industries investigated realized impressive gains in labor productivity
despite the rather modest degrees ofmechanization and capital inten-
sity in most of them suggests that other factors must have played a
significant role. An indirect method ofroughly gauging whether capital
deepening ormechanization were the principal determinants ofthe rate
ofprogress is to examine whether the records ofproductivity growth
ofthe capital- and machinery-intensive industries compared favorably
with those oftheir counterparts.
Instead of treating the relationship between the factor proportions
employed and productivity growth through a discussion of the cases
ofindividual industries, the 13 industries were ranked by both capital
intensity and machine intensity, on the basis ofinformation pertaining
to 1850 and 1832, respectively, and divided into two groups for each
dimension.24 Weighted averages of the alternative measures of labor
productivity were computed for the various classes ofindustries, and
indexes and perannum rates ofgrowth derivedfrom themare presented
in table 13.7.
Several findings of interest emerge from these estimates. Perhaps
most important is that, over the entire period from 1820 to 1860, all
categories ofindustries registered majorincreases in laborproductivity.
Itdoes appear, however, thatthe more capital-intensiveand machinery-
intensive industries generally realized somewhat larger advances, par-
ticularly in terms ofGQLP. For example, in the more capital-intensive
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pending on whether the firm or aggregate data are employed) between
1820 and 1860, whereas those less dependent on capital managed an
increase of 1440/0-175%. This differential is consistent with the view
that the utilization of machinery or capital equipment may have facil-
itated changes in production processes that increased the rate at which
raw materials could be processed into final products with a given amount
oflabor.
What is ratherpuzzling aboutthese comparisonsbetweenthe various
classes of industries is that the qualitative results appear sensitive to
whether the productivity estimates are derived from the samples of
firm information or from the aggregate data. Especially in 1860, the
aggregate figures suggest much greater productivity growth in the capital-
intensive and machinery-intensive industries, relative to their coun-
terparts, than do the estimates obtained from the firm reports. Since
both sets ofestimates would be expected to be biased downward, as
discussed above, the substantial disparity might be thought to shed
light on which sources of biases are most serious and accordingly to
convey information about the structure of the manufacturing sector.
In particular, it might seem to suggest that the disproportionate sam-
pling offirms in 1860 from less developed states biases the firm-level
productivity estimates downward by more than the aggregate produc-
tivity figures are affected by the inclusion of part-time operations in
the census totals. Such an explanation does not hold up well, however,
to the observation that no industries other than tanning and perhaps
cotton textiles have large discrepancies of the same sign between the
firm- and aggregate-level productivity estimates in both 1850 and 1860.
Instead, the sensitivity ofthe finding ofhigher productivity growth in
the capital-intensive and machinery-intensive industries to the choice
between the two sets ofestimates is primarily attributable to the enor-
mous differences in 1860 for cotton textiles and paper that have not
yet been satisfactorily accounted for. 25
Regardless ofthe appropriate interpretation ofthe significantly more
rapid progress oflabor productivity implied by the aggregate data, one
must be impressed with the extent of the advances realized by those
industries with low levels ofcapital or machinery intensity. By either
measure oflabor productivity, these industries managed growth rates
of over 2.0% per annum. Despite the evidence that industries with a
greater reliance on capital and machinery did slightly better, this strong
record would seem to bear against the view that the increasing utili-
zation ofthesefactors ofproductionperunitoflaborwere the dominant
forces in accounting for, orencouraging, growth in manufacturing pro-
ductivity during this early phase ofindustrialization.
One might legitimately challenge the persuasiveness of this argu-
ment, on the grounds that a comparison of the rates of productivity
growth between classes ofindustries defined by their factor intensities708 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
at one moment in time does not bear directly on the issue of how
changes in the ratio ofcapital to laborovertime contributedtoadvances
in labor productivity. Such a procedure does, however, establish whether
there was an association between the capital intensity of an industry
at a point in time and the future capacity for, or history of, its pro-
ductivity growth (depending on whether capital intensity is measured
atthe beginningorend ofthe period in question), butthat is a somewhat
different, if related, question. In this regard, the finding that the rates
of advance achieved were nearly equal across classes of industries
tends to suggest that any relationship between capital intensity and
productivity growth was weak during this phase of industrial devel-
opment. An alternative approach to the problem of how important
capital accumulation was in promoting productivity increase would be
to evaluateformally how much ofthe growth in laborproductivity over
some specified span oftime can be directly attributed, in an accounting
sense, to the accumulation of capital per unit of labor that occurred.
Such an analysis entails the measurement oftotal factor productivity
and will be carried out in the next section ofthe paper.
Another caveat to the interpretation ofthe comparisons between the
rates of labor productivity growth in machinery- or capital-intensive
industries and their counterparts is that the disparities are significantly
smaller for the entire period from 1820 to 1860 than they are when
attention is restricted to developments before 1850. For example, the
gap in the rate ofincrease ofGQLPbetween the mechanized industries
and the less mechanized widens from between 2.60/0-2.9% and 2.30/0-
2.4% per annum for 1820-60 to between 3.00/0-3.0% and 1.70/0-2.2%
for 1820-50. This pattern reflects both impressive rates of advance
throughout the period for all industries and an acceleration from 1850
to 1860 that is especially pronounced among, and perhaps exclusive
to, the less mechanized and capital-intensive industries. The record of
change in the capital-labor ratio is similar, in that the less mechanized
and the less capital- intensive industries experienced an extraordinary
rise between 1850 and 1860, while their counterparts failed to manifest
any robust acceleration.
This perspective on the evidence tends to place somewhat greater
emphasis on the roles played by mechanization and capital accumu-
lation in promoting labor productivity growth. The estimates can be
viewed as consistent with the notion that the advances were initially
most rapid among industries such as cotton textiles that mechanized
and were highly capital intensive early, and that the pace ofprogress
in the rest of the manufacturing sector was boosted as sophisticated
capital equipment began to be diffused more broadly during the 1840s
and 1850s. Nevertheless, it is also clear that many industries, such as
hats and furniture/woodwork, realized substantial increases in produc-709 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
tivity while they were still utilizing small amounts of capital per unit
oflabor and little or no machinery.
The findings thus support the judgment that there may have been
two general sources, or perhaps "stages," of productivity growth in
manufacturingduring earlyindustrialization. Thefirst wave ofadvances
seems to have been associated, in many industries, with changes in the
organization oflabor and otheralterations in production processes that
did not involve large adjustments in the capital-to-Iabor ratio (Goldin
and Sokoloff 1982; Sokoloff 1984b). The gains from these sorts of
improvements eventually were to be exhausted, but a second class of
innovations related to the introduction of sophisticated capital equip-
ment followed, leading perhaps to an acceleration oflabor productivity
growth (Chandler 1977; Atack 1985). These stylized "stages" undoubt-
edly fail to describe the experience of all manufacturing industries;
indeed, it is apparent that industries passed through them at different
rates and periods, and that the timing ofthe diffusion ofthe new pro-
duction methods may have varied across firms within industries with
location and other characteristics. Moreover, changes in production
techniques that encompassed aspects of both "stages" at once were
implemented in some industries. It is difficult to determine precisely
how important each development was in explaining labor productivity
growth, particularly with only the bodies ofevidence examined here.
An exploration ofmore comprehensive measures ofproductivity should,
however, help to improve our assessment of at least the relative sig-
nificance ofthe various contributors.
13.3 Estimates ofTotal Factor Productivity
Although the estimates oflaborproductivity growth presented above
are quite informative about the record ofindustrial development in the
Northeast, broadening the investigation ofproductivity to include other
factors as inputs can extend our knowledge further. It makes possible,
in particular, the decomposition of the growth in labor productivity
between the amounts attributable to increases in capital and raw ma-
terials utilized per unit oflabor and that due to advances in total factor
productivity. Such information in turn will contribute to our under-
standing ofthe evolution ofproduction methods and help to determine
how important physical capital accumulation was during the early stages
ofindustrialization.
It is useful to begin the treatment of total factor productivity by
examining the indexes of real partial factor productivity reported in
table 13.8. These figures indicate the industry-specific movements over
the period in the ratios ofgross output to raw materials, capital, and
labor. Several features ofthese estimates deserve comment. The first710 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 13.8 Indexes of Real Partial Factor Productivity, 1820-60
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Boots/shoes
GQIRM 100 107 113 141 156
GQIK 100 181 217 115 220
GQIL 100 145 145 260 230
Coacheslharnesses
GQIRM 100 121 136 154 148 155
GQIK 100 85 206 181 126 137
GQIL 100 86 187 158 233 194
Cotton textiles
GQIRM 100 89 68 82 112 123
GQ/K 100 124 222 215 301 219
GQ/L 100 200 336 341 267 379
Furniture/woodwork
GQ/RM 100 91 158 181 177 178
GQ/K 100 204 304 283 225 222
GQ/L 100 138 201 225 320 309
Glass
GQIRM 100 103 155 140
GQ/K 100 179 218 188
GQ/L 100 335 305 290
Hats
GQIRM 100 90 96 105 113 131
GQ/K 100 163 205 242 209 284
GQ/L 100 122 223 213 328 282
Iron
GQIRM 100 127 115 119 134
GQ/K 100 150 125 180 142
GQ/L 100 105 125 218 195
Liquors
GQIRM 100 180 148 146 157
GQ/K 100 83 143 114 97
GQ/L 100 90 187 221 209
Flour/grist mills
GQIRM 100 143 144 148 148
GQ/K 100 103 124 100 102
GQ/L 100 123 150 166 167
Paper
GQ/RM 100 51 72 71 107 119
GQ/K 100 150 372 310 455 321
GQ/L 100 275 816 783 751 1042
Tanning
GQIRM 100 97 95 100 117 116
GQ/K 100 93 112 143 114 117
GQ/L 100 136 180 237 217 274711 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Table 13.8 (continued)
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Tobacco
GQIRM 100 93 80 91 132
GQ/K 100 114 98 80 150
GQ/L 100 147 145 284 178
Wool textiles
GQIRM 100 65 75 70 128 124
GQ/K 100 145 208 169 263 252
GQ/L 100 236 262 226 401 412
Notes and sources: See the note to table 13.1. The nominal values of the respective
measures of partial factor productivity were converted to constant dollars with the
industry-specific price indexes presented in table 13.3. These estimates were then nor-
malized relative to a base of 100 representing the respective industry's levels in 1820.
is that in nearly all industries, each of these ratios of partial factor
productivity increases between 1820 and 1860. Although the liquors
and tobacco industries do diverge slightly from this pattern, neither
case appears to contradict significantly the general result as the de-
creases they manifest are small and sensitive to the choice between
firm- and aggregate-level estimates. Since the index oftotal factor pro-
ductivity is equivalent to a weighted average ofthese individual ratios,
it is accordingly obvious that any reasonable measure of the former
would rise over the period in all industries.
Another pattern in the data that merits emphasis is that, in all in-
dustries, labor productivity increased much more over the period than
either raw materials or capital productivity. While the gains in labor
productivity between 1820 and 1860 typically were very large, the ad-
vances in raw materials productivityobservedarequite modest. Capital
productivity appears generally to have increased less than labor and
more than raw materials productivity, although there are a few prom-
inent deviations from this pattern where it also failed to keep up with
the rise in the latter (i.e., liquors and flour/grist mills). This evidence
suggests that, in general, manufacturing production methods evolved
over time in such ways as to reduce the amounts of labor and, to a
lesser extent, capital required to process a unit of raw materials into
final product. It conforms well with the work of scholars who have
argued that many ofthe innovations introduced by manufacturers dur-
ing this period were intended to substitute relatively cheap raw ma-
terials for other inputs (Habakkuk 1962).
By dividing GQ/L by GQ/KorGQ/RM, one can calculate the change
over time in the ratios of capital or raw materials to labor from the712 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
information provided in table 13.8. These latter ratios indicate that
northeastern manufacturing did shift somewhat toward more capital-
intensive production processes, as judged by the capital-labor ratio,
between 1820and 1860. However, theextentofthis adjustmentinfactor
proportions pales by comparison with the dramatic surge in raw ma-
terials intensity that occurred contemporaneously. Whereas the
weighted-average growth in the ratio of raw materials to labor was in
the 1100/0-118% range, the rise in capital per unit of labor amounted
to only 590/0-63%. It is striking that both of these increases in the
utilization of other inputs per unit of labor are proportionally much
lower than the estimated growth in GQLP during the period. This
finding casts additional doubt on whether either raw materials accu-
mulation or capital accumulation, but especially the latter, could play
the dominant role in explaining the advance in labor productivity.
There is, ofcourse, substantial variation across the industries in the
extent of the movement toward greater capital intensity, and some of
them experienced significantly larger shifts thanthe average did. Never-
theless, as will be shown below, the increase in the ratio ofcapital to
labor was not sufficiently massive in any industry to account directly
for a major share ofthe progress realized in labor productivity. More-
over, it is interesting that the industries that underwent the most ex-
tensive capital deepening during the period may have been those that
were most capital intensive to begin with. Industries such as liquors,
flour/grist mills, paper, tanning, and wool textiles, which were among
the seven most capital intensive of the 13 in 1820, appear to have
experienced the largest increases in the capital-labor ratio. Conversely,
several of the less capital-intensive industries, boot/shoes, furniture/
woodwork, and hats, were among those with the smallest percentage
gains. Weighted averages of the two classes of industries reveal that
the capital-to-Iabor ratio rose by 450/0-79% over the period in the more
capital-intensive industries (as identified at either 1820 or 1850), and
by 160/0-95% in their counterparts. Since the estimated range of in-
crease for the former class ofindustries does not unambiguously dom-
inate thatfor the latter, one cannotmake an unqualified claim thatthose
industries that were initially most capital intensive carried out more
capital deepening. Nevertheless, it seems that the classes ofindustries
were not converging in their degrees ofcapital intensity and that many
industries remained highly labor intensive throughout the period.26
A final point to make about the indexes ofpartial factor productivity
is that they imply that the doubts some scholars have raised concerning
the accuracy of the census valuations of the capital invested in man-
ufacturing firms are unwarranted. The chief question about the use-
fulness ofthe reported capital input has been whether establishments
included working capital in their statements to census enumerators.21713 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
If, as some have argued, they did not, then estimates ofboth the growth
ofcapital intensity and total factor productivity over time would likely
be confounded. The possible seriousness ofthe problem can be eval-
uated with the more detailed information on the composition ofcapital
investments contained in the 1832 sample drawn from the McLane
Report. These datainclude separate assessments ofthe value ofcapital
invested in land and structures, tools and machinery, and inventories
(Sokoloff 1984a).
Since the bulk ofthe capital investment was in working capital, and
the 1832 estimates of total factor productivity and the capital-labor
ratio were based on valuations of the capital input that included in-
ventories, one would expect to observe some stark contrasts between
the estimates from that year and those from 1820 or 1850 if working
capital had not been incorporated as part of the reported capital in-
vestments into the censuses ofthe otheryears. More specifically, there
would be large decreases in total factor productivity and substantial
increases in capital intensity between 1820 and 1832, especially in those
industries in which investment in working capital was relatively im-
portant. No such patterns emerge, nordo the differentials in totalfactor
productivity across industries, varying with the relative investments in
fixed and working capital, that would be evident in the 1820, 1850, and
1860 data iftheir information on capital investments did not include at
least a major component ofthe working capital. It thus seems unlikely
that undervaluation ofworking capital in manufacturing censuses was
a serious defect, and correspondingly that the estimates ofthe growth
in total factor productivity and capital intensity are significantly dis-
torted as a consequence.
Indexes ofreal total factor productivity, based on the two alternative
definitions ofoutput, are presented for the 13 industries in tables 13.9
and 13.10. As with the labor productivity figures reported above, the
estimates were computed for each ofthree sets ofsubsamples offirms
so as to demonstrate the insensitivity of the results to the extent of
adjustment for part-time firms, and the price indexes appearing in table
13.3 were employed to convert the nominal measures ofgross output,
value added, raw materials, and capital to constant dollars before pro-
ductivity was calculated.
The results indicate that by either of the two measures, nearly all
industries realized substantial growth in total factor productivity be-
tween 1820 and 1860. Weighted averages ofthe records ofthe individual
industries yield estimated increases ranging from 104% to 130%, with
output defined as value added (NFP), and from 68% to 76% by the
alternative gauge (TFP). Each industry peIformed well by at least one
measure. Flour/grist mills registered the smallest advance in NFP, only
100/0-11%, butthe estimatedgain in TFPapproached50%; andalthough714 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
18ble 13.9 Indexes ofTotal Factor Productivity: Computed with Value Added
as the Measure of Output
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Boots/shoes
A 100 158 179 195 240
B 100 144 160 175 215
C 100 145 154 175 206
Coacheslharnesses
A 100 94 175 191 231 216
B 100 93 181 173 210 196
C 100 93 179 171 189 193
Cotton textiles
A 100 195 188 264 269 344
B 100 174 169 235 240 306
C 100 149 186 200 224 261
Furniture/woodwork
A 100 134 191 248 298 303
B 100 127 198 230 288 281
C 100 121 183 210 274 257
Glass
A 100 227 258 233
B 100 227 258 233
C 100 216 249 225
Hats
A 100 147 201 229 253 298
B 100 130 179 203 224 264
C 100 156 213 234 254 304
Iron
A 100 165 203 262 289
B 100 128 122 170 173
C 100 128 112 180 159
Liquors
A 100 121 184 173 193
B 100 113 160 158 168
C 100 122 156 174 164
Flour/grist mills
A 100 95 123 122 130
B 100 84 105 110 111
C 100 88 91 113 97
Paper
A 100 149 466 415 440 572
B 100 147 458 408 440 563
C 100 150 422 399 487 550
Tanning
A 100 139 168 247 157 187
B 100 114 141 201 129 152
C 100 93 127 175 120 132715 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
18ble 13.9 (continued)
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Tobacco
A 100 130 96 178 224
B 100 126 92 171 216
C 100 131 88 165 206
Wool textiles
A 100 180 227 171 332 318
B 100 141 179 134 260 248
C 100 123 157 118 212 218
Average
Weighted B 100 [143] [160] 181 [204] 230
Unweighted B 100 [144] [175] 191 [207] 240
Notes and sources: These estimates oftotal factor productivity were computed over the
same sets of observations as the corresponding labor productivity estimates presented
in, tables 13.1 and 13.4 were. See the notes to tables 13.1 and 13.4. The index of total
factor productivity for the weighted average of the industries was computed with the
same weights, and in the same manner, as the index of labor productivity reported in
the latter table. The output elasticities employed in the computation were selected from
a range derived by estimating Cobb-Douglas production functions overeach cross-sectional
sample. These regressions yielded estimates ofthe capital coefficient between 0.25 and
0.30. The latter value was employed here so as to increase the estimates of the inputs
in the later years relative to the earlier. The formulation of total factor productivity
employed here is NFP = (VA/](O·30Lo.70), where NFP is a measure of total factor pro-
ductivity utilizing value added as the measure of output, VA is value added, K is the
value of the capital invested, and L is the labor input. The calculations of NFP were
performed after the values ofgross output, raw materials, and capital had been deflated
to constant dollars, utilizing the price indexes reported in table 13.3. These "real"
estimates oftotal factor productivity were then normalized relative to an 1820 standard
of 100.
tobacco ranked at the bottom in terms ofprogress in TFP, its increases
of 300/0-48% in that measure, and of 710/0-116% in NFP, are not un-
impressive. The cotton textiles, wool textiles, and paper industries are
among those attaining the largest estimated increases in total factor
productivity, but major gains were also achieved by industries such as
furniture/woodwork and hats, which were among the least capital in-
tensive and mechanized throughout the period. These figures provide
dramatic testimony to how dynamic the manufacturing sector was dur-
ing the early stages of industrialization. Moreover, they serve to un-
dercut the hypothesis that capital accumulation was the driving force
behind productivity growth during this era. The substantial increases
in total factor productivity demonstrate clearly that the bulk of the
gains in labor productivity cannot be accounted for directly by capital
or raw materials deepening within manufacturing firms. In addition,
the wide range of industries that shared in this general advance of
productivity suggests that the phenomenon cannot be attributed to716 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Table 13.10 Indexes ofTotal Factor Productivity: Computed with Gross Output
as the Measure of Output
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Boots/shoes
A 100 133 142 178 197
B 100 127 134 168 185
C 100 125 129 165 179
Coaches/harnesses
A 100 104 156 166 175 171
B 100 104 159 159 168 164
C 100 104 158 158 159 163
Cotton textiles
A 100 128 141 157 180 203
B 100 121 134 149 170 192
C 100 112 133 136 164 176
Furniture/woodwork
A 100 122 184 217 229 232
B 100 116 186 206 222 220
C 100 114 179 197 218 211
Glass
A 100 163 202 185
B 100 163 202 185
C 100 160 201 183
Hats
A 100 115 148 157 185 199
B 100 108 140 148 174 187
C 100 118 153 159 186 201
Iron
A 100 137 151 187 193
B 100 122 119 153 153
C 100 124 115 157 147
Liquors
A 100 134 170 169 173
B 100 129 159 162 162
C 100 134 157 168 160
Flour/grist mills
A 100 139 154 154 159
B 100 130 143 146 147
C 100 136 138 148 142
Paper
A 100 103 203 192 246 280
B 100 102 200 190 245 277
C 100 103 192 188 256 273
Tanning
A 100 118 129 153 155 169
B 100 108 120 139 143 154
C 100 98 115 131 138 145717 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
18ble 13.10 (continued)
1850 1860
Industry 1820 1832 Firms Agg. Firms Agg.
Tobacco
A 100 113 102 132 151
B 100 111 100 130 148
C 100 114 98 128 145
Wool textiles
A 100 124 146 130 231 227
B 100 110 130 115 205 202
C 100 103 122 108 187 190
Average
Weighted (B) 100 [114] [133] 142 [168] 176
Unweighted (B) 100 [117] [141] 152 [174] 183
Notes and sources: These estimates oftotal factor productivity were computed over the
same sets of observations as the corresponding labor productivity estimates preserved
in tables 13.2 and 13.5 were. See the notes to those tables. The index of total factor
productivity for the weighted average of the industries was computed with the same
weights, and in the same manner, as the index of labor productivity reported in table
13.5. The output elasticities were selected from a range provided by Cobb-Douglas
productionfunctions estimatedcross-sectionally. Thechoicewasinfluenced bythedesire
to have the coefficients for capital and raw materials to be on the high side so as to
depress the estimated rates ofproductivity growth. The formulation oftotal factor pro-
ductivity employed here is TFP = (GQIRMO·S4L 0.33](0.13), where TFP is a measure of
total factor productivity utilizing the gross value ofoutput as the measure ofoutput, RM
is the value ofraw materials, L is the labor input, and K is the value ofcapital invested.
All of the relevant variables were deflated to constant dollars, by the indexes in table
13.3, before the calculations were performed. These "real" estimates of total factor
productivity were then normalized relative to a 1820 standard of 100.
developments such as the diffusion of new and more sophisticated
capital equipment, which touched only a relatively limited number of
industries until late in the period.
The consistency ofthe finding oflarge gains in total factor produc-
tivity, across industries and measures, bolsters confidence in the ro-
bustness ofthe qualitative result. Moreover, as the minor differences
between the C and B sets ofestimates suggest, the basic picture that
emerges is not sensitive to any reasonable adjustments ofthe subsam-
pIes to account for the existence of part-time establishments.28 It is
also encouraging to note that there are fewer implausible fluctuations
in these estimates than in the indexes oflaborproductivity, particularly
with the TFP measure. Several industries do continue to manifest strange
records of progress, but at least in the most troubling cases, paper,
tanning, and tobacco, the price indexes relied on are suspect and likely
the primary source of the problems. The other questionable features
may also be attributable to the inappropriate or defective nature ofthe
price series utilized, or an inadequate number ofobservations in some718 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
years. Whatever the explanation for these anomalies, however, the
fundamental results do not depend upon their inclusion in the manu-
facturing averages.
Estimates ofthe per annum growth rates oftotal factor productivity
have been computed from the indexes reported in tables 13.9 and 13.10
for the entire period between 1820 and 1860, as well as for several
subperiods. They are presented in table 13.11, and confirm that a wide
spectrum of manufacturing industries in the Northeast enjoyed rapid
progress in total factor productivity during this initial phase of indus-
trialization. Indeed, the weighted average per annum growth rates for
these 13 industries match, ifnot exceed, the performance ofthe United
States economy during other periods. Between 1820 and 1860, north-
eastern manufacturing appears to have achieved per annum rates of
increase of 1.80/0-2.2% in NFP and 1.30/0-1.5% in TFP. These figures
might be compared to the 1.8% rate for NFP estimated by Kendrick
(1961) for the national manufacturing sector between 1869 and 1953,
or to the 0.80/0-0.9% and 1.4% rates computed by Gallman (1986) for
the annual increase in TFP for the economy at large during the re-
spective periods 1840-1900and 1900-1960. Although some might react
to the application of these standards by rejecting the early manufac-
turing rates ofadvance as implausibly high, it should be remembered
that one would expect the pace of productivity growth in the most
dynamic sectorofthe most burgeoning region during the period to have
surpassed that for the national economy or for United States manu-
facturing in total. Hence, the finding that northeastern manufacturing
might have realized faster rates of total factor productivity increase
during its initial burst ofexpansion than economy-wide averages, per-
taining to the same orotherperiods, shouldperhapsnotbetoo surprising.
These estimates further suggest, more strongly than did those for
labor productivity growth, that productivity rose, on average, more
slowly between 1820 and 1850 than during the 1850s. The average rate
ofadvance in TFP, for example, increased from 1.00/0-1.2% perannum
over the first 30 years to 2.20/0-2.3% during the later 10. The pattern
ofacceleration is, admittedly, somewhat weaker ifone focuses on the
contrast between 1820-32 and 1832-60, and only on those industries
for which 1832 figures are available. Nevertheless, even here, the weight
ofthe evidence seems to favor a mild increase in the pace oftotal factor
productivity growth. Many researchers have contended that such an
acceleration may have resulted from a spurt in the accumulation of
more and better capital equipment, during the 1840s and 1850s (Chan-
dler 1977; David 1977; Williamson and Lindert 1980). They might tend
to argue that the process ofcapital deepening only seems unimportant,
because the conventional measures of input fail to fully detect the
technical change that is embodied in newer vintages of capital. The
accelerationoftotalfactor productivitygrowth during a decade ofmore719 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Table 13.11 Growth Rates ofTotal Factor Productivity in Selected
Manufacturing Industries, 1820-60 (Ole)
Industry 1820-32 1820-50 1850-60 1820-60
Boots/shoes
NFP 1.3-1.6 2.0-3.0 1.4-2.0
TFP 0.8-1.0 2.9-3.3 1.3-1.6
Coaches/harnesses
NFP -0.7 1.9-2.1 1.3-1.5 1.7-1.9
TFP 0.3 1.6-1.6 0.3-0.5 1.3-1.3
Cotton textiles
NFP 5.2 1.8-3.0 2.7-3.6 2.3-2.9
TFP 1.8 1.0-1.4 2.4-2.6 1.4-1.7
Furniture/woodwork
NFP 2.2 2.4-2.9 2.0-3.8 2.7-2.8
TFP 1.4 2.2-2.5 0.7-1.8 2.0-2.1
Glass
NFP 7.7 3.3 -1.0 2.2
TFP 4.5 2.5 -0.9 1.6
Hats
NFP 2.4 2.0-2.5 2.3-2.7 2.1-2.5
TFP 0.7 1.2-1.4 2.2-2.4 1.4-1.6
Iron
NFP 0.7-0.8 2.9-3.6 1.4-1.4
TFP 0.6-0.7 2.3-2.5 1.1-1.1
Liquors
NFP 0.4-1.6 0.5-3.5 1.2-1.2
TFP 0.9-1.6 0.2-2.3 1.2
Flour/grist mills
NFP -0.6-0.2 0.6-2.8 0.2-0.3
TFP 0.9-1.2 0.3-1.2 1.0-1.0
Paper
NFP 3.6 5.0-5.4 -0.4-3.3 3.9-4.5
TFP 0.2 2.2-2.4 2.0-3.8 2.3-2.6
Tanning
NFP 1.2 1.2-2.4 -2.7--0.8 0.7-1.1
TFP 0.7 0.6-1.1 1.1-1.8 0.9-1.1
Tobacco
NFP -0.3-0.8 3.1-8.9 1.4-2.0
TFP 0.0-0.4 1.5-4.0 0.7-1.0
Wool textiles
NFP 3.2 1.0-2.0 3.8-6.4 2.4-2.5
TFP 0.9 0.5-0.9 4.7-5.8 1.8-1.9
Weighted average
NFP [3.3] [1.6]-2.1 [2.4]-2.4 [1.8]-2.2
TFP [1.2] [1.0]-1.2 [2.2]-2.3 [1.3]-1.5
Notes and sources: These per annum rates of total factor productivity growth were
computed from the set B estimates reported in tables 13.9 and 13.10. See the notes to
those tables. The NFP estimates are ofthe growth oftotal factor productivity measured
with value added as output. The TFP estimates are based on the measure oftotal factor
productivity that employs gross output as the measure of output and explicitly treats
the value ofraw materials as an input.720 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
rapid diffusion ofmachinery is certainly consistent with this interpre-
tation, but alternative explanations of this feature of the economic
record are also available.29
Although some of the technical change realized between 1820 and
1860 was undoubtedly embodied in capital goods, there are several
reasons to doubt whether a proper accounting for this phenomenon
would be capable of reversing the qualitative conclusion concerning
the significance ofcapital accumulationfor productivity growth in early
manufacturing. First, even if one were to ascribe as much as half of
the acceleration in total factor productivity increase to improvements
of manufacturing capital not reflected in its price, the amount ofpro-
ductivity growth so generated would be quite small relative to the total
realized over the entire period. One might claim that more of the es-
timated advance in total factor productivity should be credited to em-
bodied technical change unincorporated in price, but the rationale for
this appears weak. Not only did the less capital-intensive and less
mechanized industries do quite well before the purported consequential
developments of the 1840s and 1850s, but their investments in ma-
chinery and tools per unit of labor remained quite small in absolute
terms, as well as in relation to their total investment in capital, at the
end of the period. Even most ofthe counterpart industries, classified
as more mechanized and capital intensive, had rather modest absolute
and relative amounts invested in capital equipment that was directly
involved in production (Sokoloff 1984a). Given that manufacturing in-
dustries had the bulk oftheirinvestments in structures and inventories,
there would seem to be severe limits on the amount ofembodied tech-
nical change that the capital input could plausibly be endowed with.30
One approach to evaluating the importance of embodied technical
change is to compare the records of total factor productivity growth
between the more capital-intensive and the less capital-intensive in-
dustries, or between the more mechanized and less mechanized ones.
The logic underlying this procedure is that where new vintages of
capital are endowed with embodied technical change, the measured
increase over time in the inputs utilized by firms will be lower, relative
to the outputs produced, and hence measured total factor productivity
will be higher. Given that one would expect the realization oftechnical
change embodied in capital and not incorporated in its price to be
associated with either the size of the capital input relative to other
inputs or the change in that relative size of the capital input over the
period in question, the more capital-intensive and mechanized indus-
tries might seem likely to have enjoyed greatertotal factor productivity
growth than the othersifthis component ofembodied technical change
was ofmuch quantitative significance.31 Although, as discussed above,721 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
the evidence of significantly more capital deepening over the period
by these classes ofindustries is not entirely robust, it is clear that they
did employ larger amounts of capital and machinery per unit oflabor
throughout the period, and carried out approximately as much capital
deepening as their less capital-intensive and mechanized counterparts
did. One might, accordingly, expect them to exhibit more total factor
productivity growth.
Whenoneexaminestheindexesoftotalfactor productivitypresented
in table 13.12 for classes of manufacturing industries, however, only
minor differences in performances emerge.32 The discrepancies in the
amount of productivity growth realized between the more and less
capital-intensive industries are rather trivial in magnitude. As for the
other system ofclassification, the more mechanized industries do seem
to have experienced higher rates ofadvance than the less mechanized
did. However, these disparities are small relative to the rates of in-
crease, and are dependent on NFP serving as the gauge for total factor
productivity. Another feature ofthese estimates that bears against the
hypothesis that much of the technical change realized was embodied
in physical capital and not reflected in its price is the relative decline
in the rate of total factor productivity growth of the less mechanized
and capital-intensive industries, as compared to their counterpart classes,
between the subperiods 1820-50 and 1850-60. As already alluded to,
the rates of increase of both capital intensity and labor productivity
accelerated sharply between the two subperiods among the former
classes of industries relative to the latter.33 If the capital investments
involved considerable embodied technical change, then one might have
expected a relative increase in the pace of total factor productivity in
the less mechanized and capital-intensive industries to have accom-
panied the relative surge in capital deepening and labor productivity.
Regardless of how persuasive these arguments for questioning the
extentofembodiedtechnicalchangeare, itis informativetodecompose
the growth over the period in gross output per equivalent worker be-
tween the amounts directly attributable, in an accounting sense, to
increases in capital intensity (K/L), in raw materials intensity (RM/L),
and in total factor productivity (TFP). The results ofsuch a procedure
are reported in table 13.13, with separate estimates presented for the
estimates obtained from the firm data and those from the aggregate
data. They indicate that in most industries the increase between 1820
and 1860 in capital intensity explains less than 10% of the growth in
labor productivity as measured by GQLP. Indeed, in no case does the
share exceed 16%. Advances in total factor productivity, on the other
hand, appeartobetheprincipalforcebehindlaborproductivitygrowth,








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.723 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Thble 13.13 Decomposition oftbe Growtb in Gross Output per Equivalent
Worker between Proportions Accounted for by Increases in Capital
Intensity, Raw Materials Intensity, and Total Factor Productivity,
1820-60 (%)
% Due % Due % Due
Industry to 4 (K/L) to 4 (RM/L) to 4 TFP
Boots/shoes
F 11 34 54
A 1 25 74
Coacheslharnesses
F 9 29 61
A 7 19 74
Cotton textiles
F -2 48 54
A 5 46 49
Furniture/woodwork
F 4 27 68
A 4 26 70
Glass
F
A 5 37 57
Hats
F 5 48 46
A 0 40 60
Iron
F 3 42 55
A 6 30 63
Liquors
F 11 28 61
A 14 21 65
Flour/grist mills
F 13 12 75
A 13 12 75
Paper
F 3 52 44
A 6 50 43
Tanning
F 11 43 46
A 11 46 43
Tobacco
F 16 59 25
A 4 28 68
Wool textiles
F 4 44 51
A 5 46 49
Notes and sources: The decomposition of the growth in gross output per equivalent
worker was based on the accounting equation:
GQLP = TFP + 0.13 (K7L) + 0.54 (RM7L),
where •signifies a derivative ofthe log. Separate decompositions were computed for the
firm-level (F) and aggregate (A) data from 1860. See the notes to tables 13.5 and 13.8.724 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
less than 25%.34 These findings dramatize how remarkably limited the
importance of capital deepening was in generating labor productivity
growth in manufacturing during early industrialization. They imply that
if capital accumulation played a substantial role at all, it was due to
improvements in capital that were not reflected in price. Given the
basis for skepticism about the extent to which technical progress was
embodied in capital outlined above, other sources of total factor pro-
ductivity, and thus oflaborproductivity, growthappearto deserve more
attention.
13.4 Conclusions
This paper has relied on four cross-sections of manufacturing firm
data to study the growth oflabor and total factor productivity during
early industrialization in the United States. Although the bodies of
evidence analyzed suffer from some defects, the procedures employed
in constructing the estimates were designed to deal with the problems
and yield growth rates that would be biased downward. Despite this
concern for producing conservative estimates, the results indicate that
a wide range of manufacturing industries realized major increases in
both labor and total factor productivity as early as the 1820s, and
continued to do so at an accelerated pace through 1860. The breadth,
magnitude, and timing ofthe advances observed suggest that the north-
eastern manufacturing sector was a dynamic one, whose productivity
growth, perhaps coupled with similar gains in agriculture, fueled the
process of industrialization in that region. The evidence would seem
to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the view that the onset of
industrial expansion in the Northeast was primarily due to the release
oflabor and other resources from a stagnant and declining agricultural
sector.
Of perhaps even greater interest, the estimates imply that increases
in total factor productivity, sometimes referred to as the residual, ac-
counted for most of the advance in labor productivity between 1820
and 1860. The deepening ofcapital, in contrast, appears to have made
only a modest contribution. Although it is possible that a major share
of the growth in the residual over the period consisted of technical
change embodied in capital equipment, which would enhance the sig-
nificance ofcapital in explaining the gains in productivity, the shreds
of evidence that can be gleaned from these data do not support this
notion. Capital accumulation may indeed have hadimportantinfluences
on the course ofearly industrial development, such as through allowing
for the extension ofthe transportation network and other social over-
head capital, but the introduction of sophisticated capital equipment
and capital deepening in general were evidently not as central to the
initial phase ofindustrialization as they have sometimes been depicted.725 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
On the contrary, the material examined here seems to suggest that
other sources of measured productivity growth in manufacturing, in-
cluding the changes in labororganizationand the intensificationofwork
that have been emphasized in recent studies, played the leading roles
(Goldin and Sokoloff 1982; Sokoloff 1984b; Lazonick and Brush 1985).
Although many questions remain, the results also appear to be con-
sistent with, if not actually to support, the view that the expansion of
markets that accompanied the onsetofindustrializationunleashedpow-
erful forces that acted to raise productivity. At least in the United
States, pre-industrial manufacturing seems to have had the potential,
which it was ultimately to realize, for substantial gains in efficiency
without major additions to the stock ofcapital equipment .utilized per
unit oflabor.
Notes
1. Nearly all studies of productivity growth during this period have been based on
information that was either highly aggregated or drawn only from a small number of
cotton textile firms (Layer 1955; Davis and Stettler 1966; David 1967, 1975, 1977;
McGouldrick 1968; Williamson 1972; 1972a, 2b, 1986; Nickless 1979).
2. Each ofthe data sets suffers from problems ofsample selection bias. The coverage
of the 1820 Census of Manufactures and the McLane Report differed substantially by
geographic region and size of establishment, with an apparent net result of an under-
sampling of smaller, and accordingly less productive, firms. The design ofthe samples
from 1850 and 1860 led to a disproportionate representation of firms from states with
limited industrial development. See Sokoloff (1982) and Atack et ale (1979) for details
on the characteristics of these samples. Since the sample selection biases are likely to
raise the estimated productivity levels for 1820 and 1832, and reduce them in 1850 and
1860, the rates of productivity growth computed from these sources should understate
the actual record.
3. The industrial classification system employed in the 1850 census was in general
adopted, but several of the industry definitions used here include two or more of the
1850 categories. The reluctance to combine datafrom different industries stemmed from
a concern about the possibility of confusing increases in labor productivity within in-
dustriesovertimewithvariationintheestimatesduetochangesinindustrialcomposition.
4. This generalization about the reporting practices of part-time establishments is
based primarily on an examination of the schedules for roughly 200 firms in the 1820
and 1832 samples that specified the fractions ofthe year they were in operation. Rather
than expunging observations of seasonal enterprises from the calculations, one would
ofcourse prefer to have accurate assessments of their inputs and outputs to work with
so that their levels of performance would be reflected in the estimates. It is likely that
part-time firms, whose relative importance declined overtime, were indeed less efficient
producers than their full-time counterparts. Accordingly, to the extent that the adjust-
ments in the composition of the subsamples do succeed in excluding all part-time es-
tablishments from consideration, the estimates of productivity growth might tend to
understate the advances realized over the period by failing to pick up the perhaps
importantgains totheeconomyofdisplacing seasonaloperatorswithfull-time producers.
5. It is admittedly unclear what fractions ofmanufacturing firms in the various years
were operating significantly fewer than 50 weeks per year (fulltime). A general sense
of the orders of magnitude has been obtained, however, from the reports by many
firms in 1832 of the fraction of the year they were in operation, from an examination726 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
ofthe cross-sectional distributions of establishments by industry, size, wage rates, and
location, as well as from inspections of the distributions of firms by measures of total
factor productivity. The approach adopted in preparing the three sets ofestimates was
not to attempt a precise delineation of the proportion of firms operating part time in
the individual years, but rather to demonstrate that no plausible assumptions about
the changes in their relative numbers would reverse the qualitative findings. Although
ad hoc in nature, this manner of displaying the patterns in the data appears effective.
One can check the sensitivity of the industry-specific results by comparing the figures
from the three sets of estimates, or by evaluating the C figures for 1820 with respect
to the B figures for the later years. The extent of the allowance for the decreasing
prevalence ofpart-time firms implied by this latter comparison appears to be extremely
generous.
6. In this paper, such summaries of the quantitative results are based on the choice
ofthe 1860 estimates computed from the aggregate data as the standard for that year.
7. The weights employed to construct the averages consist of the industry shares of
total northeastern value added and gross output, respectively, in 1850, and were cal-
culated from United States Census Bureau (1858). The two point estimates available for
12 of the industries in 1850 and 1860, as well as the growth rates they enter into, will
henceforth be expressed as a range ofestimates (Le., 720/0-112%).
8. The general robustness of the results is apparent from the observation that the
estimates of labor productivity in 1820 are greatly affected by the shift from the B
subsample to the C in only a few industries. The value-added figures are considerably
more sensitive to the subset of establishments employed in the calculations, but even
by this measure, only three ofthe industries have theirlevels oflaborproductivity raised
by as much as 15%.
9. Ofgreatest concern in this regard are the glass, liquor, and tobacco industries. All
ofthese industries are characterized by having estimates based on veryfew observations
in at least one of the years. Random variation in the estimates due to this source may
magnify the impact ofsample selection bias in some cases. For example, the extremely
high levels of productivity estimated for the glass industry in 1832 is probably related
to their being computed from information on a rather small number of glass-making
enterprises in Massachusetts. The most advanced plants in that industry were located
in Massachusetts (Davis 1949), and that state accounted for a disproportionate share of
the firms included in the McLane Report.
10. The 1850 and 1860 samples were designed to ensure that each state accounted for
a certain minimum number of observations. This feature of their collection led to an
oversampling of manufacturing firms from smaller and less-developed states such as
Maine, Vermont, and New Hampshire. The establishments located in such states op-
erated, on average, at lower levels of productivity. Accordingly, one would expect that
this source of sample selection bias would lead to underestimates of productivity. In
principle, one should be able to correctfor this sample selection problem by reweighting
the observations. In practice, however, inconsistent evidence from the aggregate census
reports and the firm samples onthe industrial compositionofstate manufacturing sectors
suggests that there are other defects in the samples that confound the identification of
the appropriate set ofweights.
11. It is, ofcourse, important to recognize that the great majority ofthe price series
pertain only to a single output or raw material ofthe respective industries. Hence, they
undoubtedly introduce errors and must be applied with caution. The four industries for
which raw materials indexes could not be retrieved are coacheslharnesses, glass, hats,
and iron. The Wholesale Price Index constructed by Warren and Pearson was employed
as a reasonable substitute in these cases, because it behaves more like the average of
the other raw materials series than the alternative general indexes. Another deficiency
is that in two industries, tobacco and tanning, the author was compelled to rely on
basically the same price index for both outputs and raw materials. It is especially un-
fortunate that separate indexes could not be obtained for these industries, because the
indexes, which pertain primarily to the price of raw materials, move quite erratically.
Additional information on whether the prices of outputs and raw materials in each of
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likely that the extraordinary variability in these price indexes accounts for at least some
of the irregular movements in the productivity growth estimates for these industries.
12. In cases where there were several alternative price indexes available, the most
conservative, with respect to the estimation of the increase in productivity over time,
were generally selected.
13. This suggests that a significant portion ofthe variability in the labor productivity
estimates is due to sharp changes in the factor proportions utilized by the firms sampled.
14. The extreme decline in the price index for paper output invites skepticism. How-
ever, it should be noted that the general stability between 1820 and 1860 in the ratio of
gross output to raw materials in that industry would seem to suggest that the output
price index might not be far off in terms of the extent of the decrease over the entire
period.
15. As was mentioned above, the price indexes for tanning and tobacco fluctuate
wildly, particularly between 1859 and 1860. The erratic behavior ofthe index for "hides
and leather" may also affect estimates for boots/shoes, because this series serves as the
index for raw materials in that industry, as well as for both outputs and raw materials
in tanning.
16. The argument presented in this paragraph applies to estimates of productivity
growth that employ value added as the measure ofoutput. Hence, it supplies a rationale
for why the value-added figures might indicate less advance over the period than those
relying on gross output as the appropriate measure of product. Given the uncertainty
about the accuracy ofthe individual price indexes, however, any conclusions about the
relative performance oftwo industries, regardless ofthe measure ofproductivity referred
to, should be offered tentatively.
17. There are, admittedly, some scholars who judge part-time operations to be the
rule during the early stages of industrialization, rather than the exception. Moreover,
few would expect there to be many firms in industries such as flour/grist mills that were
in production all year. Nevertheless, the enumerators for the McLane Report indicated
that the overwhelming majority of the establishments included in that survey claimed
to be in operation for at least 50 weeks a year. Although the level ofproduction in any
individual firm may have beencharacterized by enormous seasonal variation, there might
have been tasks that required at least some workers to be employed throughout the year.
As long as enterprises in such circumstances reported their average labor and capital
inputs, they should, for our purposes, have been classified as full-time operators and
included in the subsets offirms over which the estimates were prepared.
18. As is apparent from the evidence presented in Goldin and Sokoloff (1982), the
ratio offemale to adult male wages increased from roughly the 0.30-0.37 range in 1820
to roughly the 0.44-0.52 range in 1850 and beyond. Hence, to the extent that the wage
ratio reflects the average relative productivity ofthe two groups, it might be argued that
employing the same weights in all years leads to overestimates of the amount of pro-
ductivity growth. The issue turns, however, on whether the change in the relative pro-
ductivity of females is due to variation over time in the age or skill composition of
workers, or to some other factors. In any case, a wide range ofweights for females and
boys was tested, and the general qualitative results were found to be insensitive to
reasonable variation in them.
19. It was further assumed that in no industry at 1850 or 1860 did boys account for
more than 33%ofthe male laborforce. Such a constraint, probably serves to bias upward
the estimates of the labor input for several industries. The ceiling on the proportion of
males who were boys was introduced as another way ofensuring that the estimates of
the labor input in the later years would err on the high side, ifat all.
20. This would be expected, because of the scale economies present in most manu-
facturing industries (Sokoloff 1984b). The bias is likely to have been greater in the 1832
sample, because Massachusetts firms accounted for a highly disproportionate share of
the enterprises covered by that survey, and generally were larger and had higher-than-
average levels of measured productivity.
21. For example, the weighted average ofthe industry rate ofgrowth in gross output
per equivalent worker, as computed from the C estimates for 1820 and the B estimates
for 1860, ranges between 2.4% and 2.6% per annum. These figures are only slightly728 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
lower than the 2.5o/~2.7%range derived from the employment of the B estimates for
both years.
22. The Davis and Stettler series might be expected to yield estimates ofthe variation
in output per worker over the business cycle that were downward biased, because their
figures pertain to output per man-hour. See Davis and Stettler (1966).
23. One caveat to this generalization is that the iron and steel industry appears to
have been quite depressed during the late 1840s and early 1850s. See Temin (1964).
24. The industries were ordered in terms of capital intensity by the information on
their aggregate capital-labor ratios in the Northeast obtained from United States Census
Bureau (1858), and then divided into groups. The same classification of industries is
derived from the 1820 firm data. The ranking by machinery intensity was computed from
information contained in the 1820 and 1832 samples offirm data, particularly the latter,
as well as in United States Census Office (1895). Industries were placed in categories
on the basis ofestimates ofthe investment in ·machinery per unit oflabor computed for
1832.
25. Thecottontextile establishmentsin thefirm sampleswere, onaverage, also smaller
and substantially less capital intensive than their counterparts in the aggregate data.
Their levels of total factor productivity were, however, not much lower. The massive
disparity in measured labor productivity may be due to the less developed states', which
were overrepresented in the samples, being characterized by a much different system
or type of cotton textile manufacture.
26. It must also be admitted that these indexes of partial factor productivity not
infrequently exhibit irregular, if not implausible, movements from one point in time to
another, as well as discrepancies between the firm- and aggregate-level estimates for
1850 and 1860. As I contended above in discussing the labor productivity figures, many
of the former type of problems may be due to inaccurate price indexes, excessive
variability in point estimates because of a small number of observations, or sample
selection biases. The disparities between the independent estimates for 1850 and 1860
are disturbing, but they might again be partially explained by many of the firm-level
estimates being based on the characteristics of relatively few firms located in unrepre-
sentative areas. These anomalies in the data indicate that much caution should be ex-
ercised in drawing conclusions, particularly with respect to changes over short periods,
but they do notjustify a blanket dismissal of the results.
27. The other principal issue has concerned whether firms reported the gross value
oftheir capital investment or the net value. Recent work has tended to agree that some
net measure of the capital stock was being reflected in the figures. See Gallman (1986)
and Sokoloff (1984a).
28. Ifone computes the weighted-average growth in total factor productivity from the
C figures for 1820 and the B figures for 1860, the estimates decline only slightly. NFP
rises by 88o/~112% over the period, while TFP increases by 61 o/~69%.
29. One could, for example, explain the acceleration in total factor productivity as
arising from the expansion of product markets, which stimulated changes in the orga-
nization ofproduction within the firm, technical change, and intraregional specialization
between the more urbanized counties and the outlying areas within the Northeast (Lind-
strom 1978; Sokoloff 1984b).
30. Although it is difficult to imagine that variation in the relatively small amount of
tools and machinery per worker could account for much ofthe large changes observed
in productivity, it would be helpful to know, by industry, how the former ratio moved
over time. Unfortunately, ofall the data sets being examined here, only the 1832 sample
contains the detailed information on the composition of capital necessary to estimate
the ratio. It seems likely, however, that the percentage changes in machinery and tools
per equivalent worker would resemble the course ofthe capital-to-labor ratio, because
the shares ofcapital invested in tools and machinery had not been altered much by 1890
(Sokoloff 1984a; United States Census Office 1895).
31. This conjecture does not necessarily hold, butifall else was constant, one would
expect it to. The chiefobstacles or objections to its applicability probably concern the
variation across industries in the rates at which capital goods depreciated, old vintages
were replaced by new, and output increased over the period. The complication arising
from this latter situation is that the industries that grew most rapidly would tend to
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labor ratios were low and had not changed much, because a greater proportion oftheir
capital stock would consist ofnew-vintage items.
32. A series ofpooled cross-section productionfunctions were estimated with various
measures ofoutput serving as the dependent variable and measures ofthe inputs, year
dummies, industry dummies, class dummies, and interactions appearing as independent
variables. When variables for the interaction between dummies for the more mechanized
or capital- intensive industries and the year 1860 were included in the specifications, the
coefficients on them generally failed to indicate that these classes ofindustries realized
significantly more productivity growth between 1820 and 1860.
33. For example, the per annum rates of growth of capital per equivalent worker
between 1820 and 1850 ranged from 0.80/0-1.1% and -0.1% to +0.1% for the more and
less mechanized industries, respectively. During the next decade, the less mechanized
industries experienced a sharp acceleration in theirabsolute and relative rates ofincrease
of this variable to 4.00/0-6.8% per annum, as compared with the 0.80/0-2.1% pace reg-
istered by their counterparts.
34. Ifonedecomposes thegrowthin value addedperequivalentworker, the qualitative
result is the same. Increases in the capital-labor ratio directly account for only a small
fraction of the progress realized, leaving most of the rise in labor productivity to be
explained by advances in total factor productivity.
Comment Jeffrey G. Williamson
Motivation and Findings
Although most economic historians and development economists seem
to share the view that technological change is the driving force behind
all Industrial Revolutions, it is surprising what little we know about its
quantitative dimensions. True, since Abramovitz and Solow pointed
the way 25 years ago, we have learned somethingabout aggregate rates
of total factor productivity growth economy-wide. But we still know
very little about sectoral rates oftotal factor productivity growth, and
it is at the sectoral level that the issue is ofmost importance.
Why do we care about sectoral measures oftotal factor productivity
growth? Because we think that many of the stylized facts of the In-
dustrial Revolution that matter reflect unbalanced total factor produc-
tivity advance. Foropen economies with relatively price-elastic output
demands, unbalanced ratesoftotalfactorproductivitygrowtharelikely
to do most of the work fostering the shift in output mix toward the
dynamic modern sectors. The shift in outputmix has, in tum, important
implications for other endogenous variables of critical interest to us.
Since the dynamic sectors tend to be urban based, city job creation
and urbanization are assured. To the extent that the dynamic sectors
tend to be skill intensive, wage inequality is fostered. And to the extent
that the dynamic sectors tend to be capital intensive (especially when
the indirect requirements for urban dwellings and social overhead are
considered), investmentrequirements are augmented, saving rates tend
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to rise, and the rate of accumulation tends to accelerate. Apart from
these important macro issues, information on productivity growth by
industry clearly increases the opportunity to isolate the correlates of
growth and thus to better understand the carriers ofgrowth.
So it is that unbalanced totalfactor productivityadvance during early
industrialization must be better understood. Strangely enough, only a
handful ofThird World economiesoffersuchevidence, andfor Britain's
First Industrial Revolution we still can only guess by reference to
average labor productivities (Floud and McCloskey 1981).
There is an obvious reason for our quantitative ignorance: the data
base is poor. This fact of life insures that the intrepid researcher is
bound to stir critical debate. And so it is that Professor Sokoloff's
"Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrializa-
tion" is likely to stir critical debate here today.1
First, the database. Sokoloffhas collected establishment production
data for 1820, 1832, 1850, and 1860 in the American Northeast. The
1850 and 1860 data are taken from the Bateman-Weiss samples drawn
from the Census ofManufactures, while Sokoloff (1982) himself has
sampled the 1820 Census ofManufactures and the 1832 McLane Report.
Second, the findings. Using estimation procedures pioneered by
Abramovitz, Kendrick, Denison, and others, Sokoloff emerges with
the following impressive findings:
1. Antebellum laborproductivitygrowthin manufacturing was much
more rapid than has been appreciated (table 13.6);
2. Labor productivity growth was impressive enough in the 1820s
and early 1830s so that there appears to be only weak evidence
of trend acceleration over the antebellum period as a whole, es-
pecially in the gross output figures and especially over the first
three decades ofthe antebellum period (table 13.6);
3. The estimated rates oftotal factor productivitygrowth are very rapid
(table 13.11). They are highest in textiles, glass, paper, hats, fur-
niture, andwoodwork, butothersectorsrevealimpressiveratestoo;
4. Total factor productivity advance underwent modest acceleration
up to 1850 before rising sharply in the decade following (table
13.11);
5. Total factor productivity growth typically "accounts for" more
than 50% oflabor productivity growth over the four decades as
a whole, and capital deepening rarely "accounts for" more than
10% (table 13.13).
These are impressive findings. Can we believe them?
1. Professor Sokoloff has revised his paper extensively since the Williamsburg Con-
ference. Asa result, someoftheremarks I madeasa discussantnolongerhaverelevance.
This comment has been rewritten accordingly, although I have tried to retain the flavor
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Three Problems
Aggregation
What was manufacturing's overall performance? While Sokoloff
supplies both weighted and unweighted averages, most of us would
prefer the former. Otherwise it is difficult to assess exactly how
important any given sector's performance was to manufacturing as a
whole. Unfortunately, the weights employed are fixed at 1850 levels
so that relatively dynamic sectors are not allowed to have their full
impact. on aggregate productivity performance as they increased their
industrial output shares over time. But even if the aggregation was
flawless, there is nothing to guarantee that those aggregates would
coincide with the true rates of total factor productivity growth in
manufacturing. Mter all, total factor productivity growth in manu-
facturing is composed of two parts, intra-industry total factor pro-
ductivity growth, which Sokoloff reports in table 13.11, and interin-
dustry total factor productivity growth, which he ignores. Much has
been made of interindustry total factor productivity growth in the
development and historical literature, the result stemming from im-
proved resource allocation. For example, McCloskey (Floud and
McCloskey 1981, p. 118-19) estimates a "Harberger Triangle" due
to capital market imperfections in Britain-the area ABC in figure
CI3.1-and infers that its elimination between 1780 and 1850 would
have added 0.1% perannum to economy-wide total factor productivity
growth rates. If the same was true of labor markets, then the inter-
industry source might have been 0.2% per annum. The figures are
likely to have been even larger for a faster growing economy with a
larger boundary like America.
In short, the very modest acceleration in total factor productivity
growth up to 1850 mayor may not have been an attribute of Amer-
ican antebellum manufacturing-it depends on the importance of
each of the sectors for which Sokoloff supplies productivity esti-
















Fig. e13.1 Factor market imperfections and the Harberger Triangle.732 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
The Effective Labor Stock
How shall we aggregate heterogeneous labor inputs? American man-
ufacturing employed adult males, females, and children during the an-
tebellum period, and the labor input mix varied over time and across
industries. Sokoloffuses a constant weight rule ofthumb ("notes and
sources" to table 13.1), namely,
TE = M + 0.5(F + B) + E
where
TE = "equivalent" adult male workers = "effective" labor stock
M = adult males
F = females
B = boys
E = the entrepreneur.
This labor aggregation scheme is used throughout.
The first problem Sokoloff must confront is that the 1850 and 1860
censuses do not report adult males and boys separately. His solution
is to assume that the 1820 distribution applies to 1850 and 1860 as well.
Sokoloffthinks that this assumption is likely to impart a "small upward
bias" to the measured growth ofthe effective stock oflabor. I suspect
that the bias may be larger than he admits, and that labor productivity
and total factor productivity growth rates may be significantly under-
stated, and further that the relative stability in productivity growth up
to 1850 may be in part a spurious fabrication. I encourage Sokoloff to
prove me wrong by sensitivity analysis.
The second problem which Sokoloff's procedure introduces is the
constant weight applied to females and boys. The weight is guided by
an average ofthe age/sex wage ratios prevailing in the 1850s (ranging
between0.34 and 0.55), when in fact it rose sharply overthe antebellum
period (from a range between 0.25 and 0.35 in the 1820s). While So-
koloffbelieves the constant-weight procedure tends to understate labor
force growth, thus overstating labor productivity and total factor pro-
ductivity growth, I would like to know more about which industries
and which periods were most affected by the constant-weight assump-
tion. In any case, it is not clear to me why variable weights cannot be
used to construct the effective labor stock.
Certainly Paul David worried about both of these problems when
looking at antebellum cotton textiles (David 1970), and PamelaNickless
(1979) did as well. Indeed, Nickless (1979, p. 902) estimatedtotalfactor
productivity for cotton textiles 1836-60 to have grown far slower than
Sokoloff's estimatesfor 1832-60imply. Why? Sokoloffdoes not supply733 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
his effective laborstockestimates in the paper, butI suggest the answer
may lie with his labor aggregation scheme.
The Flow ofLabor Services
The 1820 census recorded "part-time" establishments which were
of small size and seasonal. The share of establishments which were
part-time varied over time and across industries: they appear to have
been a far smaller share ofall firms in the 1832 McLane Report as well
as in the 1850 and 1860 censuses. To the extent that scale economies
mattered during this era ofthe rise oflarge scale factories, and given
that the smaller, part-time firms were less efficient, then the demise of
the part-time firms was an important ingredient ofindustry total factor
productivity growth. Indeed, Sokoloff himself supports this view in
this paper and elsewhere (Sokoloff 1984). If I understand Sokoloff
correctly, this important source ofproductivitygrowth has beenpurged
from his samples Band C. Since it appears he has used B from table
13.6 onward, he understates total factor productivity growth, partic-
ularly for those industries in which the decline ofpart-time establish-
ments was especially dramatic, and especially early in the antebellum
epoch.
Sokoloff is faced with the following problem. The part-time firms
record total employment stocks, rather than seasonally adjusted labor
service flows. Rather than attempt to convert the part-time labor force
tofull-time estimates, Sokoloffchoosesinstead to truncate his samples.
That is, those firms with "low" total factor productivity are purged
from the sample on the grounds that they are the part-time firms in
whichlaborinputs are overstated. Those purgedfrom sample Bamount
to 29% in 1820, 5% in 1832, 9% in 1850, and 10% in 1860. Sokoloff
also truncates his samples from the top, but the magnitudes are far
smaller.
I have trouble with this treatment of part-time firms. Their demise
was an important part ofthe technological process that Sokoloffis out
to measure, and I believe the underlying total factor productivity growth
rates are seriously biased as a result. Would the stability in productivity
growth up to 1850 still be apparent if part-time firms were properly
treated? I wonder.
How else might Sokoloffproceed? Here's one suggestion. Compute
the average annual wage payment (by age and sex if possible) per
worker by sector in the 1820 full-time firms (already identified by their
"high" total factor productivity). Convert those annual wage rates to
monthly wage rates. Assume that the monthly wage rates apply to the
part-time firms, infer the number of months that the part-time firms
were in operation, and scale down the laborinput to the part-time firms
accordingly.734 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
References
Atack, Jeremy. 1985. Industrial structure and the emergence of the
modern industrial corporation. Explorations in Economic History
22:29-53.
Atack, Jeremy; Bateman, Fred; and Weiss, Thomas, 1979. An evalu-
ation ofnineteenth century censuses as sources ofeconomic statis-
tics. Paper delivered to the Cliometrics Conference, Chicago.
Brady, Dorothy S. 1964. Relative pricesin thenineteenthcentury. Jour-
nal ofEconomic History 24:145-203.
--. 1966. Price deflators for final product estimates. In Output,
employment, and productivity in the United States after 1800,
Dorothy S. Brady. ed. Studies in Income and Wealth 30. New York:
National Bureau ofEconomic Research.
Chandler, Alfred D. 1977. The visible hand: The managerial revolution
in American business. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cole, Arthur E. 1938. Wholesale commodityprices in the UnitedStates,
1700-1861. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Cole, Arthur H., and Smith, Walter B. 1935. Fluctuations in American
business, 1790-1860. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
David, Paul A. 1967. The growth of real product in the United States
before 1840: new evidence, controlled conjectures. Journal ofEco-
nomic History 27:151-97.
---. 1970. Learning by doing and tariff protection: A reconsidera-
tion ofthe case ofante-bellum United States cotton industry. Journal
ofEconomic History 30, no. 3 (September): 521-601.
---.1975. Technical choice, innovation andeconomic growth. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
---. 1977. Invention and accumulation in America's economic
growth: A nineteenth century parable. International organization,
national policies and economic development, ed. Karl Brunner and
Allan Meltzer. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Davis, Lance E., and Gallman, Robert E. 1978. Capital formation in
the United States during the nineteenth century. In The Cambridge
economic history ofEurope, ed. Peter Mathias and M. M. Postan.
Vol. 7, pt. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Davis, Lance E.,and Stettler, H. Louis. 1966. The New Englandtextile
industry, 1825-60: trends and fluctuations. In Output, employment,
and productivity in the United States after 1800, ed. Dorothy S.
Brady. Studies in Income and Wealth 30. New York: National Bureau
ofEconomic Research.
Davis, Pearce. 1949. The development ofthe American glass industry.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.735 Productivity Growth in Manufacturing during Early Industrialization
Floud, Roderick, and McCloskey, Donald, eds. 1981. The economic
historyofBritain since 1700, Volume 1:1700-1860. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
Gallman, Robert E. 1972a. Changes in total U.S. agricultural factor
productivity in the nineteenth century. Agricultural History 46:191-
209.
---. 1972b. The pace and pattern of American economic growth.
In American economic growth, ed. Lance Davis et al. New York:
Harper & Row.
---. 1983. How do I measure thee? Let me count the ways: In-
vestment and the capital stock in the nineteenth century. Paper de-
livered to the CaltechlWeingart/Social Science History Association
Conference: The Variety ofQuantitative History, Pasadena, Calif.
--. 1986. The U.S. capital stock in the nineteenth century. In this
volume.
Goldin, Claudia, and Sokoloff, Kenneth. 1982. Women, children, and
industrialization in the early Republic: Evidence from the manufac-
turing censuses. Journal ofEconomic History 42, no. 4:741-74.
Habakkuk, H. J. 1962. American and British technology in the nine-
teenth century: The searchfor labour-saving inventions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kendrick, John W. 1961. Productivity trends in the United States.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Landes, David S. 1969. The unbound Prometheus: Technological change
andindustrial development in Western Europefrom 1750 to the pres-
ent. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
--. 1985. What do bosses really do? Mimeographed. Harvard
University.
Layer, Robert G. 1955. Earnings ofcotton mill operatives, 1825-1914.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Lazonick, William, and Brush, Thomas. 1985. The "Horndahl effect"
in early U.S. manufacturing. Explorations in Economic History 22:53-
96.
Lebergott, Stanley. 1964. Manpower in economic growth: The Amer-
ican record since 1800. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Lindstrom, Diane. 1978. Economic development in the Philadelphia
region, 1810-1850. New York: Columbia University Press.
McCloskey, Donald. 1981. The Industrial Revolution 1780-1860: A
survey. In The economic history ofBritain since 1700, ed. Donald
McCloskey and Roderick Floud. (eds.), Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press.
McGouldrick, Paul. 1968. New England textiles in the 19th century:
Profits and investments. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.736 Kenneth L. Sokoloff
Marglin, Stephen A. 1974. What do bosses do? The origins and func-
tions ofhierarchy in capitalist production. Review ofRadical Polit-
ical Economics 6, no. 2:33-60.
Nickless, Pamela J. 1979. A new look at productivity in the New En-
gland cotton textile industry, 1830-1860. Journal ofEconomic His-
tory 39 (December): 889-910.
Smith, Adam. 1776/1976. An Inquiry into the nature and causes ofthe
wealth ofnations. Chicago: University ofChicago Press. Originally
published in 1776.
Sokoloff, Kenneth L. 1982. Industrialization and the growth of the
manufacturing sector in the Northeast, 1820-1850. Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Harvard University.
--. 1983. The growth ofreal wages in northeastern manufacturing,
1820-1850. Paper delivered to Social Science History Association,
Washington, D.C.
--. 1984a. Investment in fixed and working capital during early
industrialization: Evidence from U.S. manufacturing firms. Journal
ofEconomic History 44, no. 1:545-56.
--. 1984b. Was the transition from the artisanal shop to the non-
mechanized factory associated with gains in efficiency? Evidence
from the U.S. manufacturingcensusesof1820and 1850. Explorations
in Economic History 21 (October): 351-82.
Temin, Peter. 1964. Iron and steel in nineteenth century America: An
economic inquiry. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Thorp, Willard L. 1926. Business annals. New York: National Bureau
ofEconomic Research.
United States Bureau ofthe Census. 1975. Historical statistics ofthe
United States, colonial times to 1970. Washington, D.C.: Govern-
ment Printing Office.
United States Census Office. 1858. Abstract ofthe statistics ofman-
ufactures, according to the returns ofthe seventh census. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
--. 1865. Eighth census ofthe U.S., 1860: Manufactures. Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
--. 1895. Eleventh census ofthe United States: 1890. Report on
the manufacturingindustries in the UnitedStates. Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office.
UnitedStatesHouseofRepresentatives. 1833. Documentsrelativetothe
statisticsofmanufacturesin the U.S. 2vols. Washington,D.C.:DuffGreen.
Williamson, Jeffrey G. 1972. Embodiment, disembodiment, learning
by doing and constant returns to scale in the nineteenth-century
cotton textiles. Journal ofEconomic History 32:691-705.
Williamson, Jeffrey G., and Lindert, Peter H. 1980. American inequal-
ity: A macroeconomic history. New York: Academic Press.